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I. INTRODUCTION

Like two articles in prior volumes of the PacificLaw Journal,' this article will
focus on the published opinions of the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
Appellate District in civil cases during a three-year period. Whereas the prior two
articles covered the court's first six years of operation (viz., 1984-1990), this
article will review the court's decisions that were published between January 1,
1991 and December 31, 1993. More specifically, as the two prior articles did, this
article will identify the trends in the court's decisions in various areas of law and
will analyze the major decisions issued by the court during the three-year time
period.
In 1991-1993, the court again experienced a significant changing of the guard.

Former Presiding Justice Nat A.Agliano, the last remaining original member of
the court, retired on February 28, 1992.2 Also, Justice Walter P. Capaccioli, who
had joined the court on October 24, 1986, retired on December 31, 1992? Both
the court and the bar felt the loss of these two popular justices.
Following Justice Agliano's departure, the leadership of the court was
entrusted to Justice Christopher C. Cottle, who became acting presiding justice
on March 1, 1992, and assumed that position on a permanent basis on February 4,
1993. 4 Justice Cottle began his tenure on the Sixth District Court of Appeal as an
associate justice on September 29, 1988. To fill the two vacancies on the court,
Governor Wilson appointed two new justices. On February 4, 1993, Justice
William M. Wunderlich and Justice Nathan D. Mihara joined the court as
associate justices.6 Justice Wunderlich had served as a Monterey County Superior
Court judge from January 7, 1985 to February 4)1993.' Justice Mihara was a
Santa Clara County Superior Court judge from October 19, 1988 to February 4,
1993 and a Santa Clara County Municipal Court judge from July 11, 1985 until
October 19, 1988.8
During the three-year period beginning on July 1, 1989 and ending on
June 30, 1992 (the last three years for which statistics are available), the Sixth
District kept pace with its workload. During this three-year period, there were 967
to 1,069 notices of appeal filed per year in the four counties within the Sixth
District Court of Appeal, and the court disposed of between 977 and 1,026

1.
Russell J. Hanlon, The California Court ofAppealfor the Sixth Appellate District:A Review of the
Court's Opinions in Civil Cases Decided in 1988 through 1990, 22 PAc. LJ. 1057 (1991) [hereinafter
1988-1990 Review]; Russell J. Hanlon, Emerging Trends in CaliforniaJurisprudence:The FirstThree Years

of the Sixth DistrictCourt ofAppeal, 20 PAC. LJ. 1067 (1989) [hereinafter Emerging Trends].
2.
KENNETH JAMES ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 127 (6th ed. 1993).
3.
Id. at 201.
4.

Id. at 232.

5.
6.

Id
Id. at 489, 718.

7.
8.

Id.
at 718.
Id. at 489.
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appeals per year The court actually reduced its backlog by nearly 150 cases
between mid-1989 and mid-1992. On June 30, 1989, there were 999 cases
pending in the Sixth District Court of Appeal." On June 30, 1992, the court had
855 cases pending."
Practitioners benefitted from the court's reduced backlog. In 1989-90, the
median number of days between the filing of the notice of appeal and the filing
of the court's opinion in a civil case was 537 in the Sixth District, compared to
a statewide average of 5032 During the same time period, the median number of
days between close of briefing and the filing of the opinion in a civil case was 213
in the Sixth District, compared to a statewide average of 153. 13By 1991-1992, the
median number of days between the notice of appeal and the opinion in civil
cases was 386 in the Sixth District, compared to a statewide average of 467.4 In
1991-1992, the median number of days between close of briefing and the opinion
in civil cases was 126 in the Sixth District compared to a statewide average of
145." Therefore, during this three-year period, the court dramatically shortened
the length of its decision-making process.
Although it meets the challenge posed by its workload, the Sixth District's
publication rate in civil cases is slightly below the statewide average. In
1990-1991, the Sixth District published 16% of its opinions in civil appeals,

equalling the statewide average. 16 However, in 1989-1990, the court published
15% of its opinions in civil appeals, compared to the statewide average of 18%,
and in 1991-1992, the Sixth District's publication rate in civil appeals was only
13%, compared to the statewide average of 16%."7
SUPREME COURT REVERSED ALL FOUR SIXTH DISTRICT
DECISIONS PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT AS OF DECEMBER 31,1990

II. THE CALIFORNIA

In the 1988-1990 Review, it was pointed out that the supreme court had
granted review in, but had not decided, four significant cases out of the Sixth
District. The Sixth District's four opinions were analyzed in the article. Those
four cases were: (a) Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.;19 (b) Potterv. Firestone Tire &

9.
See 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 22; 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 22; 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 24.
10.
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 24.
11.
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OFCALFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 22.
12.
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 33.
13.

Id.

14.

2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OFCAL1FORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 30.

15.

Id.

16.
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 31.
17.
2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 31; 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 35.

18.
1988-1990 Review, supra note 1, at 1076-82, 1131-33, 1140-41.
19.
271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1990), review grantedand opinion superseded,798 P.2d 1214, 274 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1990).
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Rubber Co.;20 (c) CarnaDevelopers,Inc. v. MarathonDevelopment California,
Inc.;2 and (d) Hill v. NCAA2 2 The supreme court ultimately reversed the Sixth
District's decision in all four cases.
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,z3 the supreme court held that an accountant
has no general duty of care to third parties and cannot be sued for the negligent
performance of an audit by any person other than the client who contracted for
the audit.24 Thus, the supreme court rejected the major holding and reasoning of
the Sixth District in the latter court's Bily opinion. The supreme court also
concluded that although a third party cannot maintain an action against an
accountant for general negligence, an accountant may be liable for negligent
misrepresentations, made in an audit report, to a third party who acted in reliance
upon the misrepresentations in a transaction that the accountant intended to
influence.2 Finally, the supreme court determined that an accountant can be liable
to reasonably foreseeable third parties for intentional fraud in connection with an
audit report.'
In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' the supreme court held that a
plaintiff may not recover damages for fear of cancer, in the absence of an existing
physical injury or illness, unless he or she pleads and proves that the defendant's
negligence exposed the plaintiff to a toxic substance that threatens cancer and the
plaintiff's fear results from knowledge, substantiated by reliable expert opinion,
that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop cancer in the future
from the toxic exposure. 2 The supreme court refused to adopt the Sixth District's
holding that a plaintiff could prove the reasonableness of a fear of cancer by (a)
the mere fact of an exposure through the ingestion of a carcinogen, or (b) a
significant increase in the risk of cancer The supreme court further established
an exception to its general rule: A plaintiff can recover damages for negligent

infliction of emotional distress resulting from a fear of cancer, in the absence of
any physical injury or illness and without proving that he or she probably would
get cancer, if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant negligently
exposed the plaintiff to a carcinogenic substance, the defendant acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice, and the plaintiffs fear of cancer results from
knowledge, substantiated by expert opinion, that the toxic exposure significantly

20.
274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990), review grantedand opinion superseded, 806 P.2d 308, 278 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1991).
21.
259 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1989), review grantedand opinion superseded,783 P.2d 183, 264 Cal. Rptr.
824 (1989).
22.
273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1990). review grantedand opinion superseded,801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr.
319 (1990).
23.
3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51 (1992).
24.
Bily, 3 Cal. 4th at 376, 406, 834 P.2d at 747, 767, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53, 73.
25.
Id. at 376,413, 834 P.2d at 747,772, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53,77.
26.
Id. at 376, 415, 834 P.2d at 747, 773, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53, 79.
27.
6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993).
28.
Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 974, 997, 863 P.2d at 800, 816, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555-56, 571.
29.
Id. at 989-90, 863 P.2d at 810-11, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565-66.
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increased the plaintiff's risk of cancer and resulted in a significant actual risk of
cancer.30
In Potter, the supreme court additionally declined to embrace the Sixth
District's ruling on the issue of the recoverability of medical monitoring costs.
The Sixth District had ruled that' the recovery of medical monitoring costs
required proof that the plaintiff either had an existing physical injury or was
threatened with a future injury that was more likely than not to occur.3 However,
the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff had only to prove, through expert
testimony, that the need for future medical monitoring was a reasonably certain
effect of the plaintiffs exposure to carcinogens and that the recommended
monitoring was reasonable.32
In a landlord-tenant case, the California Supreme Court again disapproved the
conclusion and reasoning of the Sixth District. In Carma Developers (California),
Inc. v. MarathonDevelopment California,Inc.,33 the supreme court held that a
lease provision, which allowed the lessor to terminate the lease and recapture the
premises upon receiving the lessee's notice of an attempt to sublet or assign the
leased premises, did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.' The
supreme court found that the court of appeal misapplied the balancing test
whereby a court, in determining the validity of a lease provision, weighs the
amount of restraint imposed against the justification for the provision.35 The Sixth
District had found that the quantum of restraint in the challenged lease provision
was "total" and thus, the provision was invalid. The supreme court rejected this
conclusion because the lease at issue already had a limited term and the lessor
probably would elect to terminate the lease, upon notice of a proposed sublease
or assignment, only in a rising market.36Therefore, the restraint on alienation was
only partial. The supreme court also disagreed with the Sixth District's finding
that justification for the lease provision was entirely lacking, observing that the
lessee, rather than the lessor, was attempting to get more than it bargained for by

seeking to profit on a sublease in a rising market after expressly bargaining away
that benefit.37 Finally, the supreme court refused to accept the Sixth District's
conclusion that the lessor's termination of the lease, in order to recapture the
premises and profit from the increased rental value of the property, violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The supreme court emphasized that the
lessor's action was allowed by the express provisions of the lease and thereby
came within the reasonable expectations of the parties3 '

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 999-1000, 863 P.2d at 818.25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573.
Id. at 1005, 863 P.2d at 822, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577.
Id. at 974, 1005-07, 863 P.2d at 800,822-23,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555-56, 577-78.
2 Cal. 4th 342, 826 P.2d 710, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1992).
CannaDevelopers, 2 Cal. 4th at 351, 363, 826 P.2d at 712, 721, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469, 478.
Id. at 357-58, 826 P.2d at 716-17,6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474.
Id. at 361, 826 P.2d at 719, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476.
Id. at 361-62, 826 P.2d at 719-20,6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476-77.

38.

Id. at 376, 826 P.2d at 729, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
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In Hill v. NCAA, 39 the supreme court once again reversed the Sixth District
in a major constitutional law case involving the right of privacy. In Hill, the
supreme court rejected the Sixth District's use of the "compelling interest" test
in evaluating the constitutionality of the NCAA's mandatory drug testing
program for athletes who participate in intercollegiate athletics.40 In place of that
test, the supreme court announced that, in order to prevail on a claim of a
violation of the state constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff must prove: (a) a
legally protected privacy interest; (b) a reasonable expectation of privacy under
the circumstances; and (c) the defendant's serious invasion of the plaintiffs
privacy. The defendant can assert justification, as well as other defenses.4 '
Although it questioned the reasonableness of an athlete's expectations of privacy
in a locker room setting, the supreme court essentially found that the studentathletes had proven the three elements of their claim, but .that the NCAA
ultimately must prevail on its justification defense.!2 Specifically, the court
43
determined that the NCAA was justified in using the "direct monitoring"
procedure for obtaining urine samples from athletes, in order to achieve accurate
drug testing and thereby promote the NCAA's legitimate interests in maintaining
the integrity of intercollegiate athletics and protecting the safety of athletes."
Significantly, the supreme court stated in Hill that its ruling, which upheld the
legality of the NCAA's drug testing program, would not necessarily apply to drug
testing programs of employers."5 Thus, the court expressly reserved the question
of the constitutionality of an employer's drug testing program for applicants or
current employees.
III. GENERAL TRENDS IN CIVIL CASES DECIDED IN 1991-1993

In 1988-1990, the major trends in the Sixth District's published opinions in
civil cases were that the court: (1) disfavored tort plaintiffs; (2) strongly preferred
the position of insurers in coverage and bad faith cases; (3) disfavored wrongful
termination plaintiffs; (4) generally upheld government action in environmental
and land use cases; (5) preferred neither side in landlord-tenant cases; (6)
vigorously enforced First Amendment rights; (7) strictly applied procedural
dismissal rules against plaintiffs; and (8) overwhelmingly countenanced the
government's position in various types of cases in which a public entity was a
party.46 In 1991-1993, the same trends generally continued with minor

39.
7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
40.
Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 34-35, 46-47, 865 P.2d at 654, 661-62,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56, 863-64.
41.
Id at 35-40, 865 P.2d at 654-57,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-59. For example, the defendant can negate
one of the three essential elements that the plaintiff needs to prove.
42.
Id. at 40-51, 865 P.2d at 657-65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-67.
43.
"Direct monitoring" requires an athlete to supply a urine sample in the presence of an NCAA
official monitor of the same gender. Id. at 50, 865 P.2d at 664,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
44.
Id. at 44-50, 865 P.2d at 659-64, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-66.
45.
Id. at 54-55, 865 P.2d at 667, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869.
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adjustments. The profile of the court's 1991-1993 decisions appears substantially
similar to the picture of the court's 1988-1990 decisions in civil cases. There are
no new or surprising trends.
In its tort cases in 1991-1993, the Sixth District continued to frown upon tort
plaintiffs, especially when the government was a defendant. In all six tort cases
in which a public entity was the defendant, the court ruled in favor of the
government. 4 7 In four other cases involving only private parties, the court denied
tort liability in every case.48 In three tort cases involving the issue of toxic
contamination of real property, the court denied recovery to the plaintiffs in one
case, allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their claim in another case, and rejected a
polluter's attempt to minimize its share of interim cleanup costs in a third case.49
In four tort cases involving the application of a statute of limitations, the court
found for the plaintiff in two of the cases and the defendant prevailed in the other
two cases.50
In insurance law cases decided in 1991-1993, the court continued to favor
insurers, but not to the pronounced degree as it did in 1988-1990. In eight
insurance coverage cases in 1991-1993, the Sixth District ruled in favor of the
insurer in five cases." The insurer prevailed in both of the bad faith cases decided
in 1991-1993V2
Whereas the court seemed to favor employers in its employment law opinions
in 1988-1990, it struck an even balance in its employment law decisions over the
last three years. In 1991-1993, employees won three out of five wrongful hiring
or wrongful termination cases involving private employers. 3 In five employment
law cases involving public employers, the government prevailed in three cases.-'
Whether the defendant was a private or public entity, the court seemed to look
kindly upon claims based upon age discrimination or the denial of retirement
benefits. In three labor law cases, management prevailed over the union in two

cases.

5

The court continued to uphold government action in environmental and land
use cases, although not to the same marked degree as in past years. In 1991-1993,
the court applied the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") in only one
case, determining that the public agency had complied with CEQA.5 6 In four
cases in which the court reviewed land use restrictions during the last three years,

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

1988-1990 Review, supra note 1, at 1062-65.
See infra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-163 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 164-208 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 209-253 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 255-296 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 307-354 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 355-407 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 408-433 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 434-442 and accompanying text.
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the court upheld the government regulations in two cases and invalidated the
regulations in the other two cases.57

There were no discernible currents in the Sixth District's decisions in real
property law cases in 1991-1993. In two cases involving the anti-deficiency law
statutes,58 the court's ruling protected the debtor in one case, but the court created
and applied an equitable exception to the anti-deficiency laws in the other case.59
In two cases triggered by a dispute between a seller and a buyer of real property,
the buyer was victorious in both cases.' In one case involving a broker's right to
a commission, the broker prevailed.6 In two landlord-tenant cases, the court ruled
62
in favor of the landlord in one case and against the landlord in the other case.
As always, the court addressed significant constitutional law issues in
1991-1993. In two cases, the court continued to show its enthusiasm for enforcing
First Amendment values, especially freedom of speech and of the press.63 In three
cases, the court had occasion to address the validity of a new tax in light of the
Proposition 13 supermajority requirement for new taxes.' The court invalidated
the new tax in two cases and upheld the new tax in a third case.6" Thus,
notwithstanding its customary benign disposition toward government, the Sixth
District demonstrated that it will not hesitate to enforce constitutional provisions,
even where the result is to block or delay the construction of significant public
works projects.
In 1991-1993, the Sixth Distict continued to enforce procedural statutes
strictly against plaintiffs. In three cases, the court applied a dismissal statute to cut
off the rights of the plaintiff.6 In a fourth case, the court reversed a dismissal of
the plaintiff's complaint.67
In sum, the salient trends in the Sixth District's published opinions in civil
cases in 1991-1993 were that the court: (1) continued to disfavor tort plaintiffs;

(2) continued to prefer insurers, but not to the same degree as in the past; (3) no
longer showed an inclination to rule for employers in employment law cases- (4)
slightly favored government action in environmental and land use cases; (5)
revealed no tendencies in real property law cases; (6) continued to enforce First
Amendment rights and readily upheld constitutional challenges to the creation of

57.

See infra notes 443-485 and accompanying text.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580a, 580b, 580d (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting a judgment for a
deficiency upon a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on real property after the property has been sold
at a foreclosure sale).
59.
See infra notes 486-511 and accompanying text.
60.
See infra notes 512-531 and accompanying text.
61.
See infra notes 532-544 and accompanying text.
62.
See infra notes 545-571 and accompanying text.
63.
See infra notes 572-599 and accompanying text.
64.
CAL. CONST. art. XtItA, § 4 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring that a new tax be approved by a vote of
two-thirds of the electorate).
65.
See infra notes 600-662 and accompanying text.
66.
See infra notes 664-698 and accompanying text.
67.
See infra notes 699-705 and accompanying text.

58.
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new taxes; (7) continued to apply procedural statutes strictly, resulting in
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims; and (8) generally favored the government overall
in various areas of litigation.
IV. TORT CASES

In its published decisions in 1991-1993, the Sixth District evinced a hostility

toward tort liability. Apart from cases involving toxic contamination of property
or the application of a statute of limitations, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim
in ten out of ten cases. The court's results were more evenly balanced in the
property contamination and statute of limitations cases.
A. The Sixth DistrictRuled in Favor of the Government in All Six Tort
Cases Involving Public Defendants
In six out of six tort cases in which a public entity was the defendant, the
Sixth District refused to fasten liability on the government.
1. The Court DecidedAll Four Government Immunity Cases in Favor
of the Public Defendant
The court enforced a government immunity in all four cases in which it
construed and applied an immunity statute.
In Knight v. City of Capitola,5 the court affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the city under Government Code section 831.2, which immunizes a
public entity from liability for any injury caused by a natural condition on
unimproved public property.69 The plaintiff was injured severely while body
surfing near a beach located within the city. He sued the City of Capitola and the
County of Santa Cruz, among others. He contended that public "improvements"
caused his injury because Capitola beach had been rebuilt and a rock groin jetty
had been created to shelter the beach 17 years before his accident!'
In Knight, the court of appeal determined that, over a long period of time, the
city's construction work combined with natural forces, to produce the condition
that caused the plaintiff's injuries.!7 ' Observing the majority rule-which holds
that the section 831.2 immunity applies where a plaintiff's injuries result from a
combination of human and natural forces that, over time, create a condition
closely resembling a natural condition-the court concluded that section 831.2

68.
69.

4 Cal. App. 4th 918, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
CAL. GOV'TCODE § 831.2 (West 1980).

70.
71.

Knight, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 923-25, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876-77.
Id. at 928-29, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880.
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barred the plaintiffs action.72 The plaintiff invited the court to adopt and apply
the "hybrid condition" exception to the statutory immunity. Under that exception,
a public beach is deemed to be "improved" (and the statutory immunity
unavailable) if a public entity provides lifeguards or warning signs on an unimproved beach, but negligently fails to give sufficient warnings of known unsafe
conditions at the beach. 3 As it did in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court,7 4 the
Sixth District declined the plaintiffs invitation because there was no evidence
that he relied on the Capitola beach lifeguards to warn him about any dangerous
condition that might cause injury. 5 Therefore, the court again refused to apply the
"hybrid condition" exception to section 831.2 immunity. The court's application

of section 831.2 seems correct and consistent with the majority rule in California.
Perhaps the most significant ruling in Knight was the appellate court's
affirmance of the trial court's award of attorneys' fees in favor of the County of
Santa Cruz and against the plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038.
Section 1038(a) allows a trial court to award attorneys' fees to a public defendant,
in an action under the California Tort Claims Act,76 where the plaintiff has not
"brought the proceeding with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that
there was a justifiable controversy under the facts and law.... ."' In Knight, after
the plaintiff filed his claim with the county but before he filed his lawsuit, county
counsel advised the plaintiff that the county did not own or maintain the beach at
which the plaintiff was injured." Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought his action
against the county and counsel for the plaintiff contended that the plaintiff should
have been allowed to sue the county and ascertain the true facts regarding
ownership of the beach through discovery.79 The court of appeal rejected that
contention, emphasizing that after the county's denial of ownership, counsel for
plaintiff should have conducted further preliminary investigation (including a
review of public records) before suing the county.' Knight should serve as a
warning to practicing attorneys that they must do their homework before naming
a public entity as a defendant in a lawsuit.
72.
Id.; see, e.g., Tessier v. City of Newport Beach, 219 Cal. App. 3d 310,313-14,268 Cal. Rptr. 233,
235 (1990) (discussing formation of sandbar); Morin v. County of Los Angeles, 215 Cal. App. 3d 184, 194,
263 Cal. Rptr. 479, 485 (1989) (describing hidden sandbar as a natural condition of the beach); Fuller v.
California, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926,938, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586,593 (1975) (stating the increased amount of sand was
due to a combination of government acts and natural forces).
73.
See Gonzales v. City of San Diego, 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 885-86, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1982)
(holding that the city's voluntary provision of lifeguard services at an unimproved beach, coupled with its
negligent failure to warn of a dangerous riptide condition of which it was aware or should have been aware,
created a hybrid natural and artificial condition to which the immunity under section 831.2 did not apply).
74.
198 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1006-07, 244 Cal. Rptr. 105, 108-09 (1988); see 1988-1990 Review, supra
note 1, at 1070-71 (discussing the Sixth District's criticism of the "hybrid condition" exception created in
Gonzales).
75.
Knight, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 929-30, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8BO-881.
76.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
77.
CA.. CIv. PNOC. CODE § 1038(a) (West Supp. 1994).
78.
Knight, 4 Cal. App. 4th at 936, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885.
79.
Id. at 935, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885.
80.
Id at 940,6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888.
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In Brookhouser v. California,"'the Sixth District overturned a $2,700,000
judgment against the state and a state social worker, basing the reversal, in part,
upon the immunity provided by Government Code section 856.2. Section
856.2(a)(2) immunizes a public entity and public employees from liability for
"[a]n injury to, or the wrongful death of, an escaping or escaped person who has
been confined for mental illness or addiction."' In Brookhouser,the plaintiff was
a mentally ill person who frequently walked away from mental institutions and
facilities in which she had been placed! 3 A state social worker knew about the
plaintiff's history.' When the state arranged for the placement of the plaintiff in
an unlocked care facility, the social worker did not tell the operator of the facility
about the plaintiff's history. 5 The operator authorized the plaintiff to go shopping
one day, but to return to the facility by 5:30 in the afternoon. The plaintiff did not
return on schedule, but instead, went wandering. Two days later, she was struck
by an automobile and severely injured.86 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she
had been authorized to leave the care facility and thus, she could not be an
"escaped person" within the meaning of section 856.2, but the court of appeal
disagreed.87
In Brookhouser,the court first determined that a mental patient could be an
"escaped person," under section 856.2, even if he or she did not or could not
intend to escape; in other words, "escaped," for the purposes of section 856.2, has
a different meaning than it would under criminal law!' Next, the court decided
that the legislative policy to provide care facility operators and public entities
with broad discretion regarding the control of mentally ill persons, without fear
of liability, required a broad definition of escape under section 856.2. Thus, a
patient is deemed to have "escaped" if he or she departs, without authorization,
from any reasonable degree of control imposed by a care facility operator 9
Applying these standards, the court held that the plaintiff, although authorized to
leave the facility to go shopping, became an "escaped person" once she failed to
return by 5:30 that afternoon. 9° The court explained that the section 856.2
immunity applied, not because the plaintiff's departure was willful or wrongful,

but to encourage reasonable decisions regarding the control of mentally ill
patients.9
The Sixth District's application of the immunity statute in Brookhouser seems
questionable. Under the plain language of section 856.2, the government is

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

10 Cal. App. 4th 1665. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (1992).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856.2(a)(2) (West 1980).
Brookhouser, 10 Cal. App. 4th at 1670-71, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
Id.
Id. at 1671, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
Id. at 1672-73, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d at 662.
Id. at 1684-85, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 1683, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669.
Id.
Id. at 1686, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 671.
Id.
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exonerated from liability in a situation where a "confined" mentally ill person has

"escaped" for the policy reasons identified by the court. In Brookhouser,
however, the plaintiff was not confined at the time of her injury. Instead, the state
arranged the placement of the plaintiff at an unlocked care facility. The direction
that she return to the facility at a certain time on a given date does not seem to
constitute confinement. If the plaintiff were not confined, she could not have
escaped within the meaning of section 856.2. Notwithstanding the important
public policies articulated by the court, it seems that the Legislature, by its choice
of language in section 856.2(a)(2), intended that the immunity extend only in a
situation where an actually confined mentally ill person actually has escaped-not
the situation in Brookhouser.2
In Uyeno v. California,93 the Sixth District applied an immunity statute to bar
a wrongful death action. In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action for the
wrongful death of their son, who was struck and killed by a truck at an
intersection. 9 A state employee had designed and implemented the timing plan
for the traffic signal at that intersection by preparing a preliminary plan and
observing traffic at the intersection for eleven hours after the timing for the traffic
signal had been set.95 The plaintiffs contended that the collision resulted from the
improper timing of the traffic signal.9 Specifically, they argued that the intersection required an all red mode for two seconds, rather than half a second, to
allow traffic to clear before the traffic signal turned green. 7
The state claimed immunity under Government Code section 830.6.
Section 830.6 exempts public entities and public employees from liability for an
injury caused by the plan or design of a public improvement "where such plan or
design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the
legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee
exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or
design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved.... .,'
The plaintiffs maintained that design immunity was inapplicable because the
design or plan for the timing of the traffic lights at the intersection was not
established or approved prior to its implementation?9

92.

Compare Buenavista v. City and County of San Francisco, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1173,255 Cal.

Rptr. 329, 332 (1989) (holding that a patient admitted to a mental institution on a seventy-two hour psychiatric
hold, even if left unattended, is confined within the meaning of section 856.2) and Los Angeles County-U.S.C.
Medical Center v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 454, 461,202 Cal. Rptr. 222, 226 (1984) with McDowell
v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 321,328, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783 (1979) (holding that there was no
confinement or escape for the purposes of section 856.2 where a county hospital unsuccessfully tried to send
a mental patient to a public hospital in a taxicab, rather than an ambulance, and the patient killed the plaintiffs'
decedent).
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234 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 286 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1991).
Uyeno, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1374,286 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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Id. at 1378, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
Id. at 1375, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).
Uyeno, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1378,286 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
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While recognizing that traffic signal plans cannot be determined and
approved fully before implementation, the Uyeno court decided that the statutory
requirements for immunity were satisfied because the traffic signal plan was
established and approved before the public had to rely upon the signals.' In
other words, the state employee's approval of the traffic signal plan fulfilled the
requirement of a prior discretionary approval under section 830.6, even though
approval occurred after installation and observation.'O
In Uyeno, the court again reached rather far to bring a case within a
government immunity statute. Section 830.6 applies where a plan "has been
approved in advance of the construction."" The Sixth District acknowledged that
the plan at issue "requires some observance in operation and does not readily lend
itself to a full preimplementation determination."' 3 It seems that the correct
conclusion was that the statute simply did not apply to the factual situation in
Uyeno, not that the factual situation could be construed to fit the statute and
trigger immunity."°
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Winslow ("RTC"),' 05 the Sixth District had its

first opportunity to consider and apply the federal common law and statutory
D'Oench Duhme doctrines. t 6 Under the D'Oench Duhme doctrines, no
agreement, obligation, or representation made by a federally insured financial
institution is enforceable against a federal banking authority, following a federal
takeover of the financial institution, unless the agreement, obligation, or representation was in writing. Although the D'Oench Duhme doctrines do not technically grant immunity, they serve as a complete bar to an action against federal
banking authorities when the criteria are met.
In the RTC case, Winslow obtained a $415,000 judgment against a financial
institution based upon his claim that the institution negligently represented that
it would finance his new business until the business became profitable, and that
the institution had authority to do so. 7 The RTC assumed control over the
financial institution around the time of the filing of the notice of appeal!" On
appeal, the RTC argued, for the first time, that the D'Oench Duhme doctrines
barred the judgment because the judgment was based upon unenforceable oral

100.
101.

Id. at 1379, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 332.

102.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1980).

Id.

103. Uyeno, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1379,286 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
104. Cf. Johnston v. County. of Yolo, 274 Cal. App. 2d 46, 53-55, 79 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38-40 (1969)
(holding that a county could not invoke the section 830.6 immunity where the design of a double-curve road
alteration was never approved before construction).
105. 9 Cal. App. 4th 1799, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (1992). The author, as lead appellate counsel,
represented plaintiff and appellant Resolution Trust Corporation in this case.
106. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (listing requirements necessary for valid
agreements against the interests of the corporation); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942) (describing a federal policy to protect the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
107.
RTC, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 1803-04.12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 512-13.
108. Id. at 1805, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 513.
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misrepresentations."° Winslow raised constitutional, statutory and evidentiary
arguments in opposing the application of the D'Oench Duhme doctrines."0 The
court of appeal rejected all of those arguments, holding that public policy
demanded application of the D'Oench Duhme doctrines, even though those
doctrines were asserted for the first time on appeal.' The court reversed the
judgment in favor of Winslow because his claim was based on an oral misrepresentation, barred by the D'Oench Duhme doctrines."' The application of the
D'Oench Duhme doctrines to the facts in the RTC case was straightforward. The
significance of this case lies in the fact that the Sixth District became the first
California court to rule that the D'Oench Duhme doctrines can be raised for the
first time on appeal if a federal banking authority has intervened after entry of
judgment.
2. In Its Only Breach of Duty Case Involving a Public Defendant, the
Sixth DistrictCourt Ruledfor the Government
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District issued only one opinion in a breach of duty
tort case involving a public entity, deciding that case in favor of the government.
In Hernandez v. City of San Jose,"' the Sixth District affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the city in a parent's action for the wrongful death of her
son."' The decedent was a passenger in a car which was stopped by two city

police officers." 5 The police officers gave the driver a ticket for exceeding the
speed limit and not carrying a driver's license." 6 As none of the passengers were
old enough to have a driver's license, the police officers directed that the car be
towed." 7 The decedent took a ride with another individual and died after that car
was in a single-car accident." 8 The plaintiff claimed that the police officers
breached a duty to arrange for safe transportation for her son or to contact her so
that she could provide safe transportation for him after the first vehicle was
towed." 9
Following its decision in City of Sunnyvale v. Superior Court, 20 the
Hernandezcourt disagreed, concluding that the police officers had no duty to take

109.
Id. at 1809-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
110.
Id. at 1809-12, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d at 516-18.
111.
Id. at 1810-11, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516-17.
112.
Id. at 1809-10, 1812, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2dat516,518.
113.
14 Cal. App. 4th 129, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (1993).
114.
Henandez, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 131, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589-90.
115.
Id. at 131-32, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
116.
Id. at 132, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
203 Cal. App. 3d 839, 842,250 Cal. Rptr. 214,216 (1988) (holding that police officers who cited
two men for unlawful possession of alcohol in a vehicle did not owe a duty to another passenger to advise him
to find other transportation).
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control of the decedent or provide transportation for him, because the officers had
no special relationship with the decedent that triggered a duty to control his
conduct.' As in City of Sunnyvale, the Sixth District reached the proper result
with this decision.'22
3. The CourtLikewise Resolved Its Sole Tort Claims Case in Favorof
the Government
The Sixth District faced only one tort claims case in 1991-1993, and in it, the
government prevailed.
In Briggs v. Lawrence,122 the court held that a salaried full-time public

defender, who represented an assigned client, was a public employee acting
within the scope of his or her employment, rather than an independent contractor,
for the purposes of the California Tort Claims Act. 124 Consequently, in a former
client's legal malpractice action against a public defender, the court ruled that the
former client was required, under the California Tort Claims Act, 25to file a claim
with the public defender's employer (i.e., the county) before the former client
could pursue his malpractice claim. 26 Given that the client had failed to file the
requisite claim in Briggs, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment
in favor of the public defender. 27 In deciding that a public defender was a public
employee rather than an independent contractor, the court properly rejected the
on the same issue and expressed
majority decision of an Indiana Court of Appeals
2
1
case.
that
in
dissent
the
its agreement with
B. The Sixth DistrictDecided All FourPrivate Defendant Tort Cases in
Favor of the Defendants
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District decided four tort cases involving private
defendants, excluding the real property contamination and statute of limitations
cases that are discussed separately. In all four cases, the court ruled in favor of the
defendants. Two of those cases involved medical malpractice actions in which the
doctors prevailed on appeal.
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Hernandez, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 135,17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
See 1988-1990 Review, supranote 1, at 1067-68 (describing the decision in City of Sunnyvale).
230 Cal. App. 3d 605, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1991).
Briggs, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 609, 618, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80,586; see also CAL.GOV'T CODE

§§ 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
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See CAL.Gov'T CODE §§ 911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.6(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994). These

provisions compel a party, who wants to sue a public employee based upon the employee's alleged negligence
in performing his or her public duties, to first file a claim with the public employer of that employee.
126. Briggs, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 618, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
Id. at 609, 619, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 580,586.
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128.
(focusing on the lack of control the County had over the attorney).
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In Dumas v. Cooney, 29 the court of appeal reversed a $321,400 judgment
against two doctors on the ground that there was a prejudicial error in the jury
instructions.'3 The plaintiff's medical malpractice action was based upon delayed
diagnosis and treatment of lung cancer. The trial judge instructed the jury that the
plaintiff could recover damages if there was "evidence that it is a reasonable
medical probability that the plaintiff would have benefitted by possible cure,
possible lengthening of his life... ..""
The Sixth District in Dumas held that the jury instruction was erroneous
because the instruction allowed the recovery of damages for mere possibilities,
such as possible cure and possible lengthening of life, in violation of established

California law. 32 The court explained that the causation element of a medical
malpractice action requires proof, based upon expert testimony, that a better
1 33
medical result probably would have occurred absent the doctor' s negligence.
Therefore, the appellate court rejected the "lost chance" theory of medical malpractice, which allows recovery for a lost chance (of less than 50%) of survival
or shortened recovery, whether the theory was viewed as a relaxed causation
standard or a special type of injury." 4 The court concluded that only the Legislature could alter the causation standard, and that the argument that "lost chance"
was a special form of injury was nothing more than a disguised attempt to alter
the "more probable than not" standard of causation in medical malpractice
actions. 35 The Dumas decision is well-reasoned and properly allocates responsibility for any change in public policy on this issue to the Legislature.
In Gilman v. Beverly California Corp.,"36 the court decided whether the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA") cap on non-economic
damages, 37 or the Proposition 51 allocation of non-economic damages among
defendants3 should applyfirst in the computation of the reduction of a jury's
award of non-economic damages in a medical malpractice action. Civil Code
section 3333.2 allows a plaintiff to recover non-economic damages to compensate
for pain and suffering in a medical malpractice action and specifies that "[i]n no
action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)."" Civil Code section 1431.2(a) provides that
a defendant's liability for non-economic damages is several, not joint, and that
"[e]ach defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages
allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of
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fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that
amount.""4 In Gilman, the jury awarded non-economic damages of $400,000 and

decided that the defendant (a nursing facility) was 90% at fault for the death of
the plaintiffs' decedent and that a non-party doctor was 10% at fault.
In Gilman, the court of appeal first applied the MICRA cap, thereby reducing
the amount of non-economic damages from $400,000 to $250,000, before
applying the Proposition 51 allocation, which further reduced the recoverable
non-economic damages to a final amount of $225,000 (90% x $250,000 =
$225,000).141 If the court had applied Proposition 51 before applying the MICRA
cap, as the plaintiffs argued, then the award of non-economic damages would
have been reduced first from $400,000 to $360,000 (under Proposition 51: 90% x
$400,000 = $360,000) and then reduced further to a final amount of $250,000
(under the MICRA cap).
The Gilman court refused to follow two pre-Proposition 51 cases142 involving
the plaintiffs' comparative fault wherein the courts decided whether to apply the
MICRA cap or comparative fault principles first in computing the plaintiffs
non-economic damages. In both cases, the courts held that comparative fault
principles (similar to Proposition 51) would apply first before the non-economic
damages were reduced under MICRA. 43 In Gilman, the Sixth District stated that
Atkins v. Strayhom and McAdory v. Rogers, as pre-Proposition 51 cases, implicated different considerations and that the method of calculating non-economic
damages in Atkins and McAdory would defeat the purpose of Proposition 51: "to
limit the potential liability of an individual defendant for noneconomic damages
to a proportion commensurate with that defendant's personal share of fault."'"
The Sixth District's rationale in Gilman is not convincing. Proposition 51,
alone, does not place a cap on the amount of non-economic damages that a
defendant may be required to pay. Thus, under the express terms and the Sixth
District's stated purpose of Proposition 51, the defendant in Gilman would have
been liable for $360,000 in non-economic damages (i.e., 90% of $400,000), but
for the defendant's good fortune that the MICRA cap exists. Moreover,
section 3333.2 authorizes a plaintiff, in a medical malpractice action, to "recover"
non-economic damages and limits the amount of non-economic damages to
$250,000.145 In Atkins, the court specifically construed section 3333.2 to limit the
recovery, rather than the mere award, of non-economic damages.46 Accordingly,

the Sixth District's computation of the reduction of non-economic damages in

140.
Id. § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1994).
Gilman, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 126,129-30, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 20,22.
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Atkins v. Strayhorn, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1380,273 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1990); McAdory v. Rogers, 215
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Cal. App. 3d 1273, 264 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1989).
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Atkins, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1393, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38; McAdory, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1279,
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Gilman, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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Atkins, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1393,273 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
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Gilman seems erroneous. The plaintiff should have been allowed to recoverthe
full $250,000 in non-economic damages through the application of the
Proposition 51 allocation before the MICRA limitation. The defendant should
have been grateful that its liability for $360,000 in non-economic damages under
Proposition 51 was reduced to $250,000 under MICRA. The fact that a non-party
was 10% at fault and, under Proposition 51, potentially liable for $40,000 does

not influence the actual defendant's liability for at least $250,000 in noneconomic damages. The plaintiffs were entitled to recover $250,000 in
non-economic damages under the MICRA cap statute. Nothing in Proposition 51
prohibited that result.
In Adams v. Superior Court, 47 the court of appeal issued a writ directing the
lower court to sustain the demurrers of the attorney-defendants in an action
against them for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. t48 The attorneydefendants represented parties who brought an action for real estate fraud against
the malicious prosecution plaintiff. 49 At a deposition in the fraud action, the
malicious prosecution plaintiff testified that she had never been convicted of a
felony."5 She actually had been convicted of two felonies and her attorneys had
filed motions to expunge those convictions or reduce them to misdemeanors
following completion of her probation.'' After the courts granted the motions to
expunge, the attorney-defendants moved for reconsideration in the criminal cases
for the alleged purpose of preserving the felony convictions for impeachment
purposes in the real estate fraud action.' 2 The courts denied the motions for
reconsideration, and the action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process
was filed.'
In Adams, the court of appeal held that the motions for reconsideration in the
criminal cases did not constitute a sufficient "action" to support a malicious
prosecution claim.' The tort of malicious prosecution requires favorable termination of a full-blown action, not a victory on a mere motion.5 5 The court also
determined that the litigation privilege5 6 applied to the reconsideration motions
in the criminal cases, even though the attorneys may not have had standing to
bring those motions,5 7 and barred the abuse of process cause of action.' 8 The
court additionally decided that the reconsideration motions did not constitute
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abuse of process because the motions did not result in a writ or order that was
misused." 9 The Sixth District's decision was correct, and it properly issued a writ
at the pleading stage in the case to prevent interference with the professional
relationship between the attorney defendants and their clients in the real estate
fraud case."6
In Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.," a case involving a dispute between
two computer companies over a failed joint development project, Unilogic sued
Burroughs for conversion of Unilogic's development efforts with respect to a
personal computer, and Burroughs asserted the defense of unclean hands based
upon Unilogic's alleged misrepresentation of its financial condition and misuse
of Burroughs' software." The jury found that Unilogic proved its conversion
claim, but awarded no damages because Burroughs established its unclean hands
defense.' 63 On appeal, Unilogic argued that unclean hands was an equitable
defense that could not be raised in a legal action and, in any event, the defense
could not be decided by a jury."
The court of appeal in Unilogic rejected both arguments. The court held that
a defendant can assert the unclean hands defense to a legal action for conversion,
especially where the defendant's alleged conversion and the plaintiff's alleged
misconduct occurred in the same transaction that serves as the basis for the
litigation.16 The reviewing court further concluded that the mere assertion of an
equitable defense does not transform a legal action into an equitable action (to be
decided only by a court without a jury) and that the trial judge properly exercised
his discretion to submit the equitable defense of unclean hands to the jury. '6 The

court's rulings certainly seem correct.
C. The Court's Rulings in Three Soil Contamination Cases Showed No
Definitive Dispositions
The discovery of toxic contamination of soil and groundwater is a problem
that plagues landowners within the boundaries of the Sixth District, and especially
in Santa Clara County. Often, a prior owner, rather than the current owner, is the
culpable party responsible for the pollution. In litigation, liability for the
expensive costs to remedy the contamination frequently is a more important issue
than liability for diminution in the market value of the land. In 1991-1993, the
Sixth District addressed these issues in two cases, ruling for the defendant in one
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case and for the plaintiff in the other case. In a third property contamination case,
the court refused to reduce a polluter's share of interim cleanup costs. 67
In CAMSIIV v. HunterTechnology Corp., r the court dismissed, on a statute
of limitations ground, a property owner's lawsuit against a former occupier whose
operations had polluted the property before the plaintiff had purchased it. 69 The
Monsanto Company originally owned the property at issue and conducted manufacturing operations on a portion of the property. In its operations, Monsanto
deposited non-toxic materials on the property. 7 ' For many years until 1983,
Monsanto leased another portion of the property to the defendant. The
defendant's manufacturing operations resulted in the deposit of toxic materials on
the leased portion of the property.' 7 ' Monsanto did not disclose the toxic
contamination when it sold the property to a partnership in December 1984. The
partnership sold the property to the plaintiff in May 1985.'7 In July 1985, a state
agency issued an order stating that non-toxic materials were discovered at the
location of Monsanto's former operations, but did not mandate any cleanup.' 3 In
June 1987, after further investigation, the state agency issued a second order
stating that toxic materials had been discovered at the location of the defendant's
former operations on the property and that a cleanup would be necessary. In June
1987, as a result of the discovery of the pollution on the property, the plaintiff lost
a sale to a potential purchaser.74 In December 1988, the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant, seeking to recover damages for cleanup costs and
diminution in market value of the property. It was undisputed that the applicable

statute of limitations was the three-year period for a claim of injury to real
property.175
In CAMSI IV, the Sixth District held that the statute of limitations barred the
plaintiff's action. 76 The court reasoned that the pertinent "harm" was the injury
to the property itself, not the harm to the particular property owner (i.e., the plaintiff).' n The reviewing court refused to accept the plaintiffs argument that no
harm occurred until the state agency issued its June 1987 order announcing the
discovery of toxic contaminants at the site formerly occupied by the defendant. 78
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As the defendant ceased its operations on the property by 1983, the plaintiff did
not bring its action within the three-year limitations period. 7 9
Next, the court of appeal concluded that the plaintiff could not benefit from
the delayed discovery rule. Here, the court determined that the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the toxic contamination and the defendant's
responsibility for it by July 1985, when the state agency issued the first order
giving notice of the presence of non-toxic pollutants on the property. 180 The court
explained that reasonable diligence required the plaintiff to conduct an investigation of the entire property after it received notice of the non-toxic pollution on
any portion of the property. 8' The December 1988 complaint was untimely
because the plaintiff was deemed to have discovered the facts underlying8 2its claim
against the defendant no later than the state agency's July 1985 order.'
In CAMS! IV, the Sixth District applied traditional rules of law, but failed to
address the unique circumstances presented by a soil contamination case.
Typically, none of the parties learn about the toxic contamination of subsurface
soil or groundwater unless and until a government agency or a property owner
has conducted a lengthy and expensive investigation of the property. The court's
ruling that the "harm" in a property damage case is the injury to the property,
rather than any injury to the owner's interest in the property, seems true enough
in most property damage cases where the injury to the land and to the landowner
occurs simultaneously. In a soil contamination case, however, the injury to the
landowner-the discovery of extensive toxic pollution that will require expensive
remedial measures and sharply reduce the value of the property-may not occur

until many years after the polluter has completed the injury to the property. In
CAMSI IV, the court should have recognized that tort law, at least in a soil
contamination case, must protect the landowner's interest in the property and not
the property itself.
Given the unusual aspects of a soil contamination case, the Sixth District's
application of the delayed discovery rule also seems suspect in two respects. First,
by finding that the plaintiff should have investigated pollution throughout its
entire property upon receiving the state agency's July 1985 order giving notice
of non-toxic pollution in a particular area of the property, the court of appeal
established a standard of diligence with no limits. Soil and groundwater testing
is an extremely expensive and uncertain process. Under the court's view of
diligence, however, a property owner, upon discovering any soil pollution of any
magnitude in any location on the property, must conduct exhaustive testing over
the entire property, regardless of the size of the property, in order to avoid a fatal
application of the statute of limitations down the road. That diligence standard
applies even though the property owner, at the time of the initial discovery of a
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limited amount of pollution, may have no reason to know or believe that a
particular party deposited toxic contaminants on the property years ago. Accordingly, under the CAMS! IV diligence standard, the discovery of any amount of
soil pollution will require even a blameless property owner to either pay for the
expensive testing or pay for the expensive remedial costs after the statute of
limitations has expired.
Second, the court's decision that the statute of limitations began to run on the
date of inquiry notice-the date of the state agency's July 1985 order-ignored
the considerable length of time required to conduct a reasonable soil
investigation. In CAMS! IV, the investigation following the state agency's July
1985 order lasted two years until June 1987, when the state agency issued its
second order regarding toxic pollution at the site of the defendant's former
operations. Thus, the investigation of soil contamination apparently lasted two
years in CAMS! IV.In any other case, an investigation of soil contamination
could take over three years. Under the circumstances, it seems neither reasonable
nor fair to charge a plaintiff with the knowledge of all facts that an investigation
would eventually produce on the day that the plaintiff first received notice of the
facts that reasonably should trigger the investigation. In CAMS! IV, the plaintiff's
complaint would have been timely if the court had charged the plaintiff with
knowledge of the facts underlying the claim against defendant as of the
completion of the investigation (i.e., June 1987).
In a case involving facts similar to those in CAMS! IV, the Sixth District ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs-property owners and allowed them to go to trial on
nuisance and trespass claims. In Capogeannisv. SuperiorCourt,'83 the defendants
initially owned the property at issue and leased it to a tenant who installed
underground fuel storage tanks on the land.'8 The tenant apparently ceased its
business operations on the property by 1981.8 The defendants sold the property
to the plaintiffs in 1984, at which time, the underground tanks were believed to
be empty.8 6 By December 7, 1987, the plaintiffs discovered that the tanks had
leaked and contaminated the soil and groundwater. 7 Although they made prior
demands against the sellers and the former tenant to assume responsibility for the
cleanup, the plaintiffs did not file their action against those defendants until
December 14, 1990.88 The court of appeal decided that the trial court's entry of
summary judgment for the defendants was in error as to the plaintiffs' nuisance
claims against all defendants, and as to the plaintiffs' trespass claim against the
tenant.' 89

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (1993).
Capogeannis,12 Cal. App. 4th at 672, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-98.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672-73, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-98.
Id. at 673, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
Id. at 672, 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798, 806.

1994 / Sixth Appellate District1991-1993
With respect to the nuisance claim, the Sixth District in Capogeannis

observed that a permanent nuisance cause of action has a three-year limitations
period. No limitations period applies, however, to a continuing nuisance claim,
although recovery is limited to only those damages that occurred during the three
years before the commencement of the action.'O Therefore, the plaintiffs'
nuisance claim would be barred if the nuisance were deemed to be a permanent
nuisance, but not if it were deemed to be a continuing nuisance.
In Capogeannis,the defendants presented evidence of a permanent nuisance,
asserting that cleanup efforts would take a long period of time and would never
be completely successful. The reviewing court, however, concluded that the
nuisance was continuing in character for two reasons.' 9 ' First, the court of appeal
reasoned that a court should not literally apply the rule that dictates that a
nuisance is permanent if it is incapable of being discontinued or abated, because
every nuisance probably can be abated at some cost. That rule should be applied
only where, as a practical matter, it would be inappropriate or unfair to require
abatement of the nuisance.' 92 Consequently, the defendants' evidence of the
impossibility of complete cleanup did not require a finding that the nuisance was
permanent. 93 Second, the appellate court relied upon the public policy favoring
the prompt remediation of soil pollution in order to prevent groundwater
contamination.!94 A finding that the nuisance was continuing would further that
policy by encouraging abatement of the nuisance, especially by the defendants,
who have an interest in limiting the liability that would result from migration of
the groundwater contamination. By contrast, a finding that the nuisance was
permanent would frustrate that policy because the plaintiffs would have no
incentive to incur the considerable expense of a cleanup any sooner than
regulatory agencies required them to do so. 9 The court's result and reasoning on
the nuisance issue seems correct and, in light of the CAMSI IV decision,
reassuring. By allowing the plaintiffs to pursue a continuing nuisance claim to
remedy soil contamination even though the claim was filed more than three years
after the discovery of the contamination, the Capogeannis court provides a

for avoiding some of the problems that can
property owner with the blueprint
96

arise in light of CAMS IV.1
In Capogeannis,the Sixth District also held that the plaintiffs could not
maintain a trespass action against the sellers, although they could against the
sellers' tenant.' 9 The court decided that the contamination of the property during
the sellers' ownership and possession of it could not establish a trespass claim

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 675-76, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.

Id. at 682, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804-05.
Id. at 678, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-02.
Id. at 682-83, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805.
Id.
Id.
See supranotes 168-180 and accompanying text.
Capogeannis, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 674-75, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
against the sellers because "one cannot commit an actionable interference with
one's own possessory right."' 98 The plaintiffs argued that they should be allowed

to maintain their trespass action against the sellers under the rule that the
continued presence on land of an object or material, which the defendant
tortiously placed on the land, constitutes a trespass. The court disagreed because
it could not find that the sellers, even if they placed contaminants on their own
land, engaged in any tortious conduct. 199 At most, the sellers were responsible for
a public nuisance that, according to the court, was not "tortious."2°
Subsequently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal criticized the Sixth District's
ruling on the trespass issue in Capogeannis.Whereas the Sixth District believes
that a nuisance is not a tort unless the nuisance gives rise to an individual's cause
of action for private nuisance, the Fifth District believes that a public nuisance is
a tort under any circumstances.02 ' Under the Fifth District's view, a property
owner's contamination of the soil on his or her own property would constitute a
tortious public nuisance. If the owner sold the property and if the contamination
remained on the property, the buyer could bring a trespass action against the
original property owner for the continued presence
of the contamination that the
2°
original owner tortiously placed on the property.
In BKHN, Inc. v. Department of Health Services, 3 the court of appeal
dismissed as unripe the plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief from a state
agency's demand to pay over $133,000 for environmental cleanup costs. The
state agency issued an interim order seeking the full amount of the costs for the
first stage of environmental remedial work at a county park from both the
corporate plaintiff and the county. 4 Under state law, a party is liable for the cost
to cleanup hazardous substances only to the extent that the portion of those costs
are attributable to the party's actions.205 In BKHN, the plaintiff believed that it
was responsible for cleaning up mercury deposited at the county park, but nothing
else." 6 The plaintiff refused to pay any portion of the remedial costs required by
the state agency order and, instead, brought the declaratory relief action.20 7
However, the plaintiff did not seek a final determination of the scope of its
liability based upon the scope of its responsibility for the pollution." 3 Rather, the
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plaintiff sought only a declaration that the state agency had no authority to impose
joint and several liability on two or more parties in recovering interim cleanup
costs . ' 9 Thus, the court of appeal correctly ruled that the declaratory relief action
was unripe because the declaration sought in that action would be meaningless.21
A determination that the state agency could not impose joint and several liability,
without a determination of the scope of each party's responsibility, would be
pointless, particularly where the state agency was seeking only interim costs.2 "
D. The Court Achieved an Even Split in Its Tort Cases Involving the
Application of a Statute of Limitations
In 1991-1993, the defendants prevailed in two tort cases based upon a statute

of limitations defense, but the plaintiffs were successful in two other tort cases
involving the same defense.
1.

The Court Applied a Statute of Limitations in Favorof Defendants
in Two Tort Cases

In Finlaysonv. Sanbrook, the court of appeal held that a cause of action for
legal malpractice, which his based upon a missed statute of limitations, accrues
not on the date that the untimely action was dismissed, but on the date that the
underlying action was lost as a result of the missed statute of limitations.2 3 The
plaintiff sued his attorney for malpractice within one year of the dismissal of the
tardy action that the attorney had prosecuted, but more than one year after the
attorney had missed the applicable statute of limitations. Under the statute of
limitations for a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must sue the attorney within
one year of the discovery of the attorney's negligence, but the limitations period
is tolled so long as, among other things, "[t]he plaintiff has not sustained actual
injury."2 15 In the recent case of Laird v. Blacker,2 6 a malpractice case involving
an attorney's negligent failure to bring the underlying action to trial within five
years, the California Supreme Court ruled that "the statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions commences on entry of adverse judgment or final order of
dismissal."2'17
Although it certainly was aware of the Laird rule, the Sixth District
concluded that entry of judgment or dismissal was not the event that started the
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running of the limitations period in the plaintiff's action in Finlayson.Instead, in
a legal malpractice action, like the plaintiffs case, which was based upon the
attorney's missed statute of limitations in the underlying action, the limitations
period began to run when the plaintiff lost the underlying action as a result of the
missed statute of limitations.2P 8 By virtue of the court's application of that rule
rather than the Lairdrule, the plaintiffs action in Finlayson was barred. The court
explained that its conclusion was consistent with the Lairdrationale that the fact
of damage, rather than the amount of damages, is the critical factor when a court
applies the legal malpractice statute of limitations?' 9
In a subsequent case, another court of appeal launched an unpleasant attack
on the Sixth District's opinion in Finlayson. In Pleasantv. Celli,220 the Second
District Court of Appeal, Division Two, decided that the plaintiff's legal malpractice action was timely in a case that presented facts indistinguishable from

those inFinlayson. 2' InPleasant,the court protested that the Sixth District failed
to justify its departure from the "bright line" rule in Laird in a missed statute of
limitations case.' For example, the Sixth District did not explain the need for a
different rule in a missed statute of limitations case compared with a missed fiveyear dismissal statute case-the situation in Laird.2' In Pleasant,the court also
criticized the Sixth District for assuming that the ascertainment of the expiration
of the statute of limitations is obvious, when in fact, tolling and estoppel rules can
cloud that picture.224 The Second District additionally noted that the Finlayson
rule could place a plaintiff in a serious predicament: The plaintiff might be
required to sue his or her attorney for legal malpractice based upon a missed
statute of limitations and, at the same time, argue in the underlying action that the
statute of limitations had not run. The Pleasantcourt further charged that the
Sixth District confused the "fact versus amount of damage" distinction with the
"wrong versus harm" distinction.226 Although an attorney's wrong may result in
instantaneous damage to the client, it is not always the case that the wrong
immediately produces the harm. 7 Ultimately, the Second District concluded that
a missed statute of limitations case requires a strict application of the Laird rule
228
for the commencement of the limitations period for legal malpractice actions.
Pleasantnot only creates a conflict with Finlayson,but the Second District
was sharply critical of the Sixth District's ruling in Finlayson.It is significant to
note that the supreme court denied a petition for review of the decisions in both

218.
219.

Finlayson, lOCal. App. 4th at 1438, 1444, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407, 411.
Id. at 1442, 1444, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at409-10, 411.

220.
221.

18 Cal. App. 4th 841, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (1993).
Pleasant,18 Cal. App. 4th at 850-51, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667-68.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 848-49,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666-67.
Id.
Id. at 848, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666-67.
Id. at 849-50, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667.
Id. at 850, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667-68.
Id.
Id.

1994 /Sixth Appellate District1991-1993
Finlayson and Pleasantwithout a depublication order in either case? 9 There
might be more significance in the supreme court's refusal to de-publish
Pleasant-thelatter of the two cases-because Pleasantcreated the conflict in
authority. At the same time, the supreme court obviously could have depublished
the Finlaysonopinion if the court believed that it was necessary or appropriate to
do so. In two recent legal malpractice cases, the Second and Third Districts,
without citing Finlayson or Pleasant,refused to apply the Lairdrule strictly in
cases where the plaintiff's harm resulted from a settlement agreement rather than
a judgment." These two cases seem to adopt the Sixth District's flexible
approach in ascertaining the accrual date for a cause of action for legal malpractice. The supreme court has granted review in one of those cases, perhaps to
resolve the conflict between the Finlayson and the Pleasantapproaches.?3 1
In Stalberg v. Western Title Insurance Co.,'' 2 another case involving the
application of a statute of limitations, the appellate court held that an attorney's
knowledge is attributable to the client for the purposes of a determination of the
date on which the client discovered his or her claim.Y2 3 Several property owners
sued a title insurer for, among other things, slander of title and breach of fiduciary
duty after the title insurer recorded "wild deeds" that created a fictitious easement
over the plaintiffs' property.2 By law, the accrual of both a claim for slander of
title and a claim for breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the injured party
discovers all facts material to the claim.?5 At trial, there was evidence that the
plaintiffs' attorney discovered the wild deeds several years before the plaintiffs
filed their lawsuitO6 The trial court denied the title insurer's request for a jury
instruction to the effect that the attorney's knowledge was imputed to his
clients? 7 The court of appeal correctly ruled that the lower court's refusal of the
jury instruction was prejudicial error. 8 The court reversed the judgment and

ordered a new trial on the title insurer's statute of limitations defenses to the
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims
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2.

PlaintiffsAvoided the Bar of a Statute of Limitations in Two Other
Tort Cases

In two other tort cases, the plaintiffs managed to ward off a fatal application
of the statute of limitations.
In Geertz v. Ausonio,240the Sixth District needed to decide whether the fouryear statute of limitations for patent defects2 4' or the ten-year statute of limitations
for latent defects 242 applied in a construction defects case. The contractor built2 4a3
two-story building, including an exterior deck on the second floor with drains.
The deck did not have a secondary drainage system for overflow when the
primary drainage system became clogged. On one occasion, the property owners
noticed an overflow of rainwater on the deck that damaged the upstairs apartment. 244 The plaintiffs leased the lower floor of the building from the property
owners to operate an antique store.245 Thereafter, rainwater flowed from the deck
into the upstairs unit of the building
and then poured into and flooded the lower
246
floor leased by the plaintiffs.
In Geertz, the court of appeal issued several significant rulings regarding the
distinction between patent and latent defects. First, the court stated that the
applicable test for a patent defect was whether a reasonable inspection would
render a defect apparent based upon the reasonable expectations of the average
consumer.2 47 Here, the court dismissed the dictum in Renown, Inc. v. Hensel
Phelps Construction Co. 248 that the knowledge of the inspector is a factor to be
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of an inspection. The Sixth District
emphasized that the applicable test is an objective one that precludes a consideration of the mental state of the property owner who makes the inspection. 9
Second, the court explained that a defect can be latent if a reasonable inspection
would disclose a manifestation, but not the cause, of the defect." Third, the court

noted that the objective test does not take into account whether the plaintiff has
had an opportunity to conduct or actually has conducted a reasonable inspection.
Instead, the test assumes that an inspection took place and requires a determination of whether an average consumer would have discovered the defect
during a reasonable inspection. 2s Ultimately, although the property owner had
seen a manifestation of the defect (i.e., the initial flooding), the court of appeal
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held that an average consumer would not have known that a secondary drainage
system should have been installed on the deck? 2 Therefore, the missing
secondary drainage system constituted a latent defect, and the ten-year statute of
limitations applied.
In Tzolov v. InternationalJet Leasing, Inc.,2 3 the appellate court ruled that
the statute of limitations for a severely injured person, who apparently has
become permanently incompetent, does not begin to run upon the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for the injured party.' The plaintiff had become incompetent
as a result of severe injuries that he had sustained in an accident'P5 His mother
was appointed guardian ad litem one year after the accident.' 6 He brought two
separate actions to recover for the injuries, but he dismissed one of those actions
and the other was dismissed for failure to serve process within three years.
When he brought a third action seven years after the accident and six years after
the appointment of his guardian ad litem, the defendant interposed a statute of

limitations defense.

8

As California law tolls the running of a statute of

limitations for an incompetent person so long as the incompetence persists,259 the
defendant sought to avoid the tolling provision by arguing that the statute of
limitations began to run upon the appointment of the guardian ad litem for the
plaintiff.!60
In holding that the statute of limitations did not bar the plaintiffs action in
Tzolov, the court of appeal reasoned that the tolling statute, by its express terms,
must apply even though the plaintiff may be permanently incompetent and a
guardian ad litem has been appointed for the plaintiff.2 6' The court also rejected
the defendant's argument that the tolling statute should not apply as a result of the
plaintiff's prior assistance of counsel, who timely brought a prior lawsuit.
Although courts in other jurisdictions had accepted that argument, the Sixth
District declined to do so, explaining that the rights of an incompetent person are
not prejudiced by the filing and dismissal of an earlier action during the plaintiff's
incompetency.26 2 Interestingly, the Sixth District allowed the plaintiff to have his
day in court, even though the court had affirmed the dismissal of one of the
plaintiff's earlier actions on the ground that summons was not timely served?63
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V. INSURANCE LAW CASES

In 1988-1990, the Sixth District exhibited a striking tendency to rule in favor
of insurance companies in cases which presented insurance law questions? 64 In
1991-1993, the court continued to travel in the same direction, but not to the same
extent. Over the last three years, insurers were victorious in seven out of ten
insurance law cases.
A.

The Sixth DistrictSlightly FavoredInsurersin Deciding CoverageIssues

In eight cases involving coverage issues in 1991-1993, the court decided five
cases in favor of insurers and ruled for the insured in the other three cases.
1.

The CourtDenied Coverage in Five Out of Eight Cases

In Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi,265 the court held that an insurance policy
that covered "bodily injury" did not provide coverage for a negligent act that
caused emotional distress without physical injury.2" The insured (an employer)
had failed to process certain forms of an employee and, as a result, the worker did
not obtain expected medical coverage through her employer? 67 After she was
denied medical insurance benefits, she sued the employer for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, but did not allege that her employer's negligent act caused
any physical injury.? The employer tendered his defense69to his general liability
2
carrier who, in turn, brought a declaratory relief action.
The court of appeal decided, in Aim, that the insured could not reasonably
have expected that his insurer would defend him on the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim because the employee's action for emotional distress was
devoid of any claim of physical injury." In reaching its conclusion, the court
emphasized that the term "bodily injury" is unambiguous and can mean only
"physical injury."2' 7 In analyzing three cases that suggested that emotional
27 2
distress might constitute bodily injury for the purposes of an insurance policy,

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See 1988-1990 Review, supranote I, at 1087-1105.
229 Cal. App. 3d 209,280 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1991).
Id. at 226, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
Id. at 213, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
Id. at 213-14, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.
Id. at 214, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
Id. at 226, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
Id. at 220-24, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 772-75. The court cited numerous out-of-state cases which

established that the Sixth District was following the majority rule. Id. at 224, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75.

272.

Keating v.National Union Fire Ins. Co., 754 F.Supp. 1431, 1438-39 (C.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd,995

F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1993); Dyer v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1540, 1546, 259
Cal. Rptr. 298, 307 (1989); Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 167 Cal. App. 3d 21, 26-32, 212 Cal. Rptr. 852, 85559 (1985). In reversing the district court's decision in Keating, the Ninth Circuit noted that California law does

not recognize insurance coverage, under a"bodily injury" provision, for emotional or physical distress resulting
from a purely economic loss, such as a bad investment. Keating, 995 F.2d at 156-57.
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the Sixth District either distinguished the cases or found that the suggestion was
pure dictum.2 73 Finally, the court of appeal concluded that the California Supreme
274 which held that a
Court's decision in Molien v. KaiserFoundationHospital,
plaintiff can maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
without any physical injuries,27 did not require a different result because Molien
did not state that emotional distress is or automatically causes bodily injury.276 In
a subsequent case, the First District Court of Appeal found that the Sixth
District's Aim was true and endorsed that opinion.2 "
In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Altieri,27 the court was required to determine
whether a homeowner's insurance policy provided coverage where the insureds'
minor son struck and injured another boy. The court held that there was no
coverage because the punch was an intentional act for which insurance coverage
was prohibited under Insurance Code section 533.279 In support of its holding, the
court found that the assault was an intentional act because it was inherently
harmful and wrongful and accordingly, the assailant's professed intention not to
harm the victim was irrelevant2" The Court of Appeal extended the supreme
2
court's ruling in J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K."l-that
child

molestation is always intentional, wrongful and harmful and thus, never
covered--to a physical, non-sexual assault case, even though the supreme court
expressly limited its holding in J.C. Penney to a sexual molestation case.283 The
Sixth District also ruled here that there was no coverage for the insureds' alleged
negligent supervision of their son because the policy excluded coverage for
bodily injury intended by "an" insured (which presumably included the insureds'
son). 284 Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed the judgment against the

insurer.

273. Aim, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 221-22,280 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74.
274.
27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831,839 (1980).
275.
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr at 839.
276. Aim, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 223-24, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75.
277.
Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 4th 846, 855-56, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 324
(1992).
278.
235 Cal. App. 3d 1352, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (1991).
279.
FireIns. Exchange, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1354, 1359-60, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361,365; see also CAL.
INs. CODE § 533 (West 1993) (providing that an insurer is not liable for a loss resulting from the intentional
acts of the insured).
280.
Fire Ins. Exchange, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1354, 1359-60, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361, 365.
281.
52 Cal. 3d 1009, 1025, 804 P.2d 689, 698, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 73 (1991), cert. denied sub nom,
Kelley v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co,, 112 S. Ct. 280 (1991).
282.
J.C.Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1025, 804 P.2d at 698,278 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
283.
FireIns. Exchange, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1359-60, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. The court observed that
while the decision in J.C. Penney was limited to child molestation cases, the J.C. Penney court's interpretation
of section 533 was relevant and binding in other contexts. See also J.C.Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1028, 804 P.2d
at 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (emphasizing that the only type of wrongdoing excluded from § 533 coverage by
the court's decision was the sexual molestation of a child).
284.
Fire Ins. Exchange, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1360-61, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-66.
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In two other cases, the court's denial of coverage was not only correct, but
straightforward. In Lick Mill CreekApartments v. Chicago Title InsuranceCo.,28 5
the Sixth District held that a title insurance policy did not provide coverage for
the buyers' cost to remove hazardous substances from the property that they had
purchased. 2 6 The appellate court declined to adopt the plaintiffs' theory that the
discovery of hazardous substances on their property rendered their title
unmarketable. The court determined that the soil contamination affected the
market value of the land, but not the marketability of title?8 7 The Sixth District
also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the existence of soil contamination
constituted a covered encumbrance on title.
In Gantmanv. United Pacific Insurance Co., 9 a case involving roof damage
to a 40-unit planned development, the court concluded that the individual members of an association could not obtain coverage under a homeowners insurance
policy issued to the homeowners association because the individuals
were not
29
additional insureds or express beneficiaries under the policy.
R.J.Reynolds Co. v. CaliforniaInsurance GuaranteeAssociation,291 involved
an obscure insurance coverage question. The defendant was an association which
paid covered claims for insolvent insurers. The defendant did not pay claims
whenever the insured had additional insurance beyond the policy with the
insolvent insurance company. More specifically, the defendant was not required
to pay a claim "to the extent it is covered by any other insurance.' 292 Although

one of its insurers became insolvent, the plaintiff did have additional insurance
with another carrier who paid a settlement of a claim against the plaintiff.
However, the plaintiff argued that it had to pay $200,000 toward this settlement
and thus, its claim, to the extent of the $200,000 payment, was not covered by the
additional insurance. The plaintiff sued to force the defendant to cover the
$200,000 payment. The court of appeal refused to accept the plaintiff's argument,
finding that the plaintiff's $200,000 payment did not go toward the settlement,
but instead, went to the additional insurer under the special terms of the insurance
policy.293 Consequently, the defendant did not have to provide coverage for the
plaintiff's $200,000 payment. The court properly applied the Insurance Code to
the facts before it.
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231 Cal. App. 3d 1654,283 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991).
286.
Lick Mill, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1665,283 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
287.
Id. at 1662, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
288.
Id. at 1663-64, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
289.
232 Cal. App. 3d 1560.284 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1991).
290.
Gantman, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1566-67, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 191-92.
291.
235 Cal. App. 3d 595, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (1991).
292.
CAL. INS. CODE § 1063.1(c)(9) (West 1993).
293.
R.J. Reynolds, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 602-03, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409-10. The plaintiff made the
payment under a retrospective rating plan whereby the insured pays a deposit on a policy and, at the end of a
specific period, the amount of the premium is computed on the basis of the amount of losses paid under the
policy. Id. at 602, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409-10.
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2.

The Court Ruledfor the Insured in Three Coverage Cases

In Xebec Development Partners,Ltd. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co.,294 the Sixth District issued a 78-page opinion in a complex insurance case,
upholding the jury's finding of coverage but ordering a new trial on the issue of
damages. Under the insurance policy issued by the defendant to the directors and
officers of Xebec Corporation (not the plaintiff), the insureds were required to
give written notice of any claim "as soon as practicable," and to cooperate with
the insurer in the defense and settlement of any claim. The plaintiff, Xebec
Development Partners, sued all of the directors and two of the officers of the
corporation for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of payments made under
an agreement between the plaintiff and the corporation. The corporation's insurer
first received notice of the lawsuit six months later when a settlement had been
negotiated on the eve of a scheduled arbitration. Under the settlement, the
directors and officers stipulated to a judgment of $9,000,000 plus $800,000 in
attorneys' fees and assigned to the plaintiff all rights under their insurance policy,

and the plaintiff gave the directors and officers a covenant not to execute the
judgment. The insurer denied coverage and refused to defend the directors and
officers. The arbitrators eventually approved the settlement and the trial court
entered a judgment on the settlement. After the assignment of the insurance
policy, the plaintiff sued the insurer to obtain coverage for the amount of the
settlement in the action against the directors and officers.
On the question of coverage in Xebec, the Sixth District upheld the jury's
implied findings that there was coverage under the insurance policy and that the
insurer breached the contract.295 In light of the jury's finding that the directors and
officers had failed to cooperate with the insurer regarding the lawsuit, the insurer
argued that it was substantially prejudiced by that failure because it was not able
to participate meaningfully in the earlier litigation and settlement negotiations,
nor to assure otherwise that its interests and the interests of its insureds were
protected. The court of appeal rejected that argument because it was based on
speculation. Furthermore, the court refused to rule, as a matter of law, that the
six-month delay in notice of the pending lawsuit substantially prejudiced the
insurer, particularly in light of the fact that notice was given four months before
the trial court entered the judgment on the settlement?"
Insofar as the issue of damages was concerned in Xebec, the Sixth District
concluded that the amount of the stipulated judgment had presumptive weight, but
that judgment could not bind the insurer because the insurer did not join in the
stipulation nor participate in any independent adjudication regarding the scope of
its liability. 29 7 The appellate court additionally found that there was substantial
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12 Cal. App. 4th 501, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (1993).
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Xebec, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 534, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
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Id. at 533-34,15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741-42.
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evidence that the settlement was reasonable.2 93 However, the court determined
that the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous to the extent that they failed
to define a "reasonable" settlement and failed to specify that the plaintiff had the
burden to prove that the settlement was reasonable.' The reviewing court noted
that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, the insurer was entitled to litigate the
merits of the plaintiff's earlier action against the directors and officers to show
that the loss under the insurance policy (i.e., the amount that the directors and
officers were legally obligated to pay the plaintiff) was less than the amount of
the settlement.3 Accordingly, the court of appeal ordered a new trial on the
issues of damages.30'
In San Jose Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., 2 the Sixth
District decided that the standard one-year limitations period in a commercial
all-risk insurance policy was tolled during the period of time between the date on

which the insured gave notice of the claim to the insurer and the date on which
the insurer formally denied coverage.30 3 The insured's crane was damaged
irreparably after it was buried under sulphur. The damage occurred no earlier than
December 14, 1985; the plaintiffs submitted their claim to their insurer on
February 16, 1986; and the insurer denied coverage 109 days later. The plaintiffs
filed their action against the insurer on December 31, 1986. The court of appeal
ruled that the action was timely, under the contractual one-year limitations period,
because that period was tolled during the 109 days between the submission and
denial of the claim.3 In reaching that result, the court extended to commercial
insurance policies the same equitable tolling rule that the California supreme
court applied to a homeowner's insurance policy in Prudential-LMICommercial
Insurancev. Superior Court. 5 The Sixth District's extension of Prudential-LMI
makes eminent sense because, for the purposes of the limitations period
applicable to a first party claim, there is no material difference between a
homeowners policy and a commercial policy.
In Pugh v. State FarmInsurance Co.,3"0the court addressed a question of first
impression regarding the meaning of Insurance Code section 11580.2(1). That
statute provides that an insurer's failure to give the insured written notice of the
statute of limitations 'applicable to the insured's claim operates to toll the
limitations period for 30 days until the written notice is given, except that: "The
notice shall not be required if the insurer has received notice that the insured is

Id. at 556, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
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represented by an attorney."3' In Pugh, the insurer talked to the insured's
attorney after the insured submitted a claim arising out of a car accident. The
insurer denied coverage. The insured gave no written notice that she was represented by counsel nor did the insurer give its insured any notice of the applicable
statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a petition to compel arbitration 14 months
after the accident and the insurer claimed that the action was barred by the
one-year limitations period in the insurance policy. The court of appeal held that
Insurance Code section 11580.2(k) requires that the insurer have written notice
of the insured's representation by counsel before the insurer can be relieved of its
duty to notify its insured regarding the statute of limitations.0 8
Given the statutory requirement that all notices mandated by the Insurance
Code shall be in writing unless a statute expressly provides otherwise,' °9 the
court's interpretation of section 11580.2(k) certainly seems reasonable.
B.

The Court Decided Two Bad Faith Cases in Favorof Insurers

In its only two bad faith cases in 1991-1993, the Sixth District ruled in favor
of the insurance company in both cases.
In Herediav. FarmersInsurance Exchange,1 0 the court held that the insurer
did not engage in bad faith when it rejected a third party-plaintiff s settlement
offer to pay the policy limits and provide a defense to the insureds at a trial
involving other defendants. 31 After sustaining severe injuries in a road accident
caused by the insured, the plaintiff sued the insured and other parties. In a settlement proposal, the plaintiff offered not to execute a judgment against the insureds
if the insurer paid the policy limits (viz., $15,000) and provided a defense to the
insureds at a trial that primarily would concern the other defendants. The

settlement offer was not accepted and the plaintiff obtained a $1,100,000 judgment after a trial. The insured assigned his bad faith claim against the insurer to
the plaintiff in exchange for a covenant not to execute the judgment against the
insured.

In the plaintiff's bad faith action against the insurer in Heredia,the court of
appeal determined that the insurer was not required to provide a defense to its
insured at trial over and above the $15,000 policy limits. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that an insurer's duty to defend may persist after the insurer
has met the liability limits under the policy. The court distinguished the Heredia
case from the situation where the insurer tenders the policy limits and abandons
the insured when the insurer remains potentially liable. In Heredia, the plaintiff's
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CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(k) (West Supp. 1994).
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settlement offer included a proposal not to execute a judgment against the insureds and thus, the court correctly decided that the insurer had no duty to pay

additional funds beyond the policy limits to defend the13insureds at trial, when the
liability of the insureds would have been eliminated?
In Tarmannv. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,314 the insured

was in an auto accident and the insurer allegedly stated that it would pay for the
repairs to the insured's car. The insured did not obtain the names of the insured's
representatives who communicated the agreement to pay for the car repairs. The
insurer later refused to pay for the car repairs and the insured was unable to obtain
the release of her car from the repair shop for a lengthy period of time. After the
insurer eventually settled the insured's claim for an amount greater than the cost
of the car repairs, the insured sued for fraud. The court of appeal rejected the
plaintiff's fraud claim because she failed to identify the names of the persons
who, on behalf of the insurer, represented that there would be coverage? 5 The
court likewise discarded the plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation
because she did not allege that there was any misrepresentation regarding a past
or existing fact.31 6 Finally, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs

allegations would not support a claim for promise without intent to perform
because the promise of coverage was made with an "honest but unreasonable
intent to perform." 3 7 The Sixth District's treatment of the fraud claims seems
proper under the circumstances.
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES

In employment law cases over the last three years, the Sixth District has
continued to move away from the pro-employer end point to a midpoint on the
spectrum. In 1985-1987, the court ruled in favor of employers in all 12 of its
employment law or labor law cases.318 In 1988-1990, the court again favored
employers in cases involving employment or labor disputes, although not in every
case. 9 In 1991-93, the court achieved a near even split in its employment law
and labor law cases. This shift in direction over the years calls into doubt any
generalization that the Sixth District favors employers.
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A. The Sixth District Favored Neither Side in Employment Disputes
Involving PrivateEmployers
1. The Court Decided Three Out of Five Wrongful Hiring/Wrongful
Termination Cases Involving Private Employers in Favor of the
Employee
One example of the Sixth District's change in direction is the court's rulings
against the employer in three out of five cases in which the plaintiff sued a private
employer for wrongful hiring or wrongful termination.
In Cassistav. Community Foods,320 a 305-pound woman sued the defendant
employer after it denied her application for a grocery store clerk position.32' The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of
a physical handicap in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA"). 322 The jury returned a verdict for the defendant 3 On appeal, the
employer contended that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that the
plaintiff had the burden to prove that "but for" her physical disability, the
defendant would have hired her.324 The plaintiff argued that she needed to prove
only that the defendant refused to hire her based, in part, on her physical
disability, and that the burden then shifted to the employer to prove that she
would not have been hired even if the employer had not considered her
disability.31 The court of appeal held that the jury instruction was erroneous, and
the plaintiff's position was correct in this case involving "mixed motives" (i.e.,
where there is evidence of both legitimate and illegitimate motives influencing the
employment decision).3 26 A necessary predicate for that conclusion was the

court's determination that the plaintiff's weight was a physical disability under
the FEHA.327 This determination was based on evidence of the defendant's belief
that the plaintiffs
weight would limit her ability to perform major life
activities?'2

The California Supreme Court reversed the Sixth District's decision in
Cassista.329 The supreme court held that a plaintiffs weight may constitute a
physical handicap or disability under the FEHA and support a claim of discrimination only where there is medical evidence that establishes that the handicap or
disability results from a physiological condition that affects a major bodily system
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and limits the plaintiffs ability to engage in a major life activity.33 ° The court
specifically ruled that evidence of an employer's perception that an applicant's
weight should disqualify him or her is insufficient to meet the statutory definition;
there must be evidence that the condition, as the employer perceives it, constitutes
a physiological disorder affecting a bodily system.33 t As the plaintiff failed to
submit evidence that met this standard, the court decided that the plaintiff failed
to prove that she was a handicapped or disabled person protected by the FEHA
and thus, she could not establish her statutory employment discrimination
claim.332
In Ewing v. Gill Industries,333 the Sixth District upheld the trial court's ruling
in favor of an employee who asserted a claim for wrongful termination based
upon age discrimination in violation of the FEHA? 4 In the years prior to the
termination of the plaintiff, the employer transferred some of the plaintiff s job
duties to younger employees, and eventually fired the plaintiff at age 67P On
appeal, the employer argued that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the
jury that the plaintiff was obligated to prove that his job was a full-time position
at the time of his termination, in order to prevail on his wrongful termination
claim based upon age discrimination.3 36 The employer relied upon the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co.,3 37 which held that a plaintiffs
proof that his job duties were transferred to younger employees six or seven
months after his termination was insufficient to establish an age discrimination
claim. 338 The Sixth District found Rose distinguishable because the job duties
there were transferred after plaintiffs termination, whereas in Ewing, the
employer transferred the plaintiff's job duties to younger employees before the
termination. Additional evidence also showed that age was a key factor in the
termination decision. 39 Therefore, the court of appeal properly concluded that the
jury instructions were not tainted by any error.'o
In Wanland v. Los Gatos Lodge, Inc.,34' the court of appeal again affirmed a

judgment for the plaintiff in a wrongful termination case.l 2 The plaintiff initially
was hired as a front desk clerk and became a member of the employees union.
After promoting the plaintiff to a catering manager position, the defendant's
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manager demanded that the plaintiff resign her union membership?" After the
plaintiff refused to leave the union, the defendant reassigned her 4 Plaintiff

refused the reassignment and resigned, claiming constructive termination? 6 At
trial, the plaintiff prevailed on her claim that the defendant lacked just cause to
terminate her? 47 On appeal, the employer argued that federal labor laws
preempted the plaintiffs action for wrongful termination because, as a union
member at the time of her termination, she purportedly was seeking to enforce
rights covered by the employer's collective bargaining agreement with the
union.3 4' The appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that the catering
manager position was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement? 4
Specifically, the evidence showed that the agreement conferred upon the employer the right to insist that supervisory personnel not be members of the union
and the employer did demand that the plaintiff quit the union? 50 The plaintiff's
refusal to quit the union after her promotion did not change the fact that the
catering manager position was not covered by the collective bargaining
agreement.35' Consequently, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's action on
preemption grounds?5 2 The Sixth District's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, in light of the evidence, was correct.
2. PrivateEmployers Won Two Wrongful Discharge Cases
In Sequoia Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,353 the Sixth District applied the
rule, recently announced by the California Supreme Court in Gantt v. Sentry
Insurance,354 that a wrongful termination action based upon the violation of a
public policy requires a showing that the policy is set forth in a constitutional or
statutory provision.355 In Sequoia, the plaintiff was a vice president of an
insurance company with an at-will employment agreement?5 6 The defendantemployer terminated plaintiff ostensibly as a cost-cutting measure.3 5 7The plaintiff

claimed that his termination resulted from his refusal to inflate the defendant's
"case reserves"--the amount of money set aside by an insurance company as an
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estimate of the total amount which the insurer likely will pay on pending
claims.358 Inflation of the case reserves decreased the defendant's profitability on
paper.359 According to the plaintiff, the public policy that his employer violated
was "derived from" Proposition 103 36 (which generally reduces and limits the
premiums which insurers can charge), in that the defendant would be allowed to
charge higher premiums under Proposition 103 if the defendant
manipulated case
36
reserves to create the illusion of low profitability on paper. '
In Sequoia,the court of appeal emphatically rejected the plaintiff's argument,
holding that Ganttrequires a higher showing than that the violated public policy
was "derived from" or "based on" a statute. 362 The court correctly construed
Ganttto restrict wrongful termination claims that are based upon the public policy
exception to cases where the public policy at issue is delineated in a constitutional
provision or a statute.363 The employer's specific conduct need not be proscribed,
but the constitutional or statutory provision must describe the prohibited conduct
in sufficient detail to give the employer notice of the public policy? 64 Applying
its interpretation of Gantt,the Sixth District decided that the employer's alleged
demand that the plaintiff increase case reserves was not prohibited by Proposition 103 or any other law and thus, there was no public policy violation that could
support the plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination.3 65
In Knights v. Hewlett Packard,366 the court again denied recovery for a
wrongful termination claim in a clear-cut case. The plaintiff was terminated after
he worked less than three days, sustained an injury, and missed his employer's
deadlines for returning to work or requesting extensions.3 67 After his discharge,
the plaintiff brought a wrongful termination action based primarily on the claim
that the defendant's personnel policies were part of his employment contract and
those policies prohibited termination except for good cause.? The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant? 69 The

court held that the defendant's personnel policies, by their terms, were mere
guidelines, not binding provisions that became incorporated into the plaintiff's
employment agreement. 370 In any event, the court understandably found that the
37
defendant had good cause for terminating the plaintiff. '
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B. The Sixth DistrictSignaledNo Preferencesin Its Employment Law Cases
Involving Public Employers
In the Sixth District's employment law cases in 1991-1993, public employers
hardly fared better than private employers. In five cases involving the hiring,
firing, or benefits of public employees, the government prevailed in three cases
and the employees prevailed in the other two.
1. The Court Decided Three Public Employee Cases in Favor of the
Government
In West Valley-Mission Community College Districtv. Concepcion,3r7 the
court of appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a community college
teacher. The district suspended the instructor after he was arrested for facilitating
the sale of a large quantity of cocaine? 73 His first criminal trial resulted in a
conviction, but the conviction was overturned on appeal on the ground of
inadequate assistance of counsel.37 The second criminal trial resulted in an
acquittal.3 75 The district pursued disciplinary proceedings before an arbitrator,

who imposed a one-year suspension.376 In the district's mandate proceeding
against the arbitrator, the trial court issued a writ directing that the arbitrator order
the dismissal of the teacher.3 Notwithstanding his acquittal, the teacher
apparently did not challenge, on appeal, the trial court's finding that he had
engaged in immoral conduct by knowingly facilitating the cocaine sale? 78 The
Sixth District decried the instructor's conduct, holding that reasonable minds
could not differ that the teacher's immoral conduct required his discharge to
prevent any danger to young students? 79 Thus, the court decided that the
arbitrator's penalty of a one-year suspension rather than dismissal constituted an
abuse of discretion.3"' Under the circumstances, it would be difficult to quarrel
with the court's conclusion.
In San Jose TeachersAssociation v. Barozzi,38 1 the reviewing court refused
the request of a teachers union to enforce a hiring practice set forth in a regulation
adopted by the State Board of Education. Regulation 5592 provides that a school
board could hire a non-teacher to coach an athletic team if the school board first
conducted an annual search of teachers and was unable to locate any qualified
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teachers for the coaching position through the search.3 2 In San Jose Teachers,the
school board hired a non-teacher to serve temporarily as a high school varsity
baseball coach without conducting the annual search specified in regulation 5592.383 The teachers' union brought suit to enforce the regulation.'"
Based upon statutory construction, the court of appeal, in San Jose Teachers,
ruled that the regulation was invalid.3" Under Education Code sections 33352 and
33031, respectively, the State Board of Education has general supervisory powers
over physical education courses in public schools and the general authority to
adopt regulations for the government of schools. 3" On the other hand, Education
Code section 35179(a) allows a school board to control interscholastic athletic
programs, including personnel.3 The Sixth District interpreted the statutory
scheme to confer on local school boards the power to control interscholastic
athletics at public schools. 3m The court additionally determined that regulation 5592 infringed upon a local school board's control over interscholastic
athletics and thus, the annual search requirement in the regulation was void?89
Although it ventured to invalidate a state regulation, the court's analysis of the
statutory scheme was sound.
In Seymour v. Christiansen,3" the court held that a school district's lump-sum

payment to a retired public employee for 21 years of unused vacation time would
be unconstitutional. The plaintiff worked for 21 years as a secretary for a school
district and never took a vacation.39 ' After her retirement, she unsuccessfully
sought payment of her unused vacation time.3 The California Constitution
prohibits the Legislature and local agencies from granting extra compensation to
public employees after services have been rendered under an agreement made
without legal authorization? 3 Education Code section 45197 authorizes an
employee in the plaintiff's position to take vacation.39 Section 45197(d) provides,
in pertinent part, that "[i]f the employee is not permitted to take his full annual
vacation, the amount not taken shall accumulate for use in the next year or be paid
for in cash at the option of the governing board."395 Education Code
section 45197(h) provides, in pertinent part: "Upon separation from service, the
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San Jose Teachers, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1380-81,281 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26.
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employee shall be entitled to lump-sum compensation for all earned and unused
vacation .... 396
In Seymour, the court of appeal construed section 45197 to allow an
employee to carry over unused vacation time only into the next year and, if the
school board does not pay the cash compensation for it, the employee must use
it or lose it.397 Based upon that interpretation, the court reasoned that section
45197 precluded the plaintiff from taking no vacation for 21 years and, upon
retirement, demanding from the school board the total amount of unused vacation
time.3 98 In the absence of any other statute authorizing payment for the unused
vacation time, the plaintiff's recovery would constitute an unauthorized payment
of extra compensation for work already performed. 3 Therefore, the court

concluded that the state constitution precluded the relief requested by the plaintiff,
except for unused vacation time during her last year of employment.
The court's statutory analysis in Seymour seems faulty. Section 45197(d)
plainly gives the school board the option each year to pay an employee for unused
vacation time or to allow the employee to rollover the unused vacation time. The
school board never elected to pay the plaintiff for the value of her unused
vacation time the prior year. Thus, under the only other option, "the amount not
taken shall accumulate for use in the next year... ."' Nothing in the statute
compels the conclusion that the employee was prohibited from continuing to
rollover unused vacation time. The statutory language does not support the
court's "use it or lose it" analysis. Instead, the statute contemplates that the
employee will be compensated for unused vacation time either by a cash payment
or by rolling over the unused vacation time. Given that section 45197(h) provides
for a lump-sum compensation for unused vacation time, there was statutory
authorization for the relief requested by the plaintiff and the state constitution
posed no bar. To the extent that the court implied that the plaintiff engaged in any
impropriety by refusing to take any vacation and then presenting the school
district with a bill for 21 years of unused vacation time, there was no basis for the
charge. The plaintiff did not seek unauthorized extra compensation, rather
payment for all unused vacation time for which the school board, at its option,
never paid her.
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2. The Court Decided Two PublicBenefits Cases in Favor of Public
Employees
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District showed that it is vigilant about safeguarding
retirement and disability benefits for the aged. In two cases that presented such
issues, the court ruled in favor of the employee in both cases.
In Smith v. Alum Rock Union Elementary School District,4 2 the court
partially invalidated an Education Code statute that discriminated on the basis of
age with respect to eligibility for disability benefits.4 3 A sixty-four-year-old

public school teacher was injured in an accident and received sick pay and
differential pay.4 When those benefits ran out, she was still disabled, and applied
for a disability allowance. 4°s She was told that she was ineligible for disability
benefits because she was more than sixty years old and thus, she was forced to
retire. She filed suit, claiming that the statute under which she was denied
disability benefits was unconstitutional.
The parties relied on various statutes in advancing their respective positions
in Smith. Education Code section 23902 allows a teacher to apply for a disability
allowance if he or she has five or more years of credited service and has not
attained sixty years of age.' The defendants contended that the age discrimination authorized by section 23902 was lawful by virtue of Government Code
section 12941(a). Section 12941(a) prohibits an employer from making any
employment decision on the basis of age as to any individual over the age of
forty, "except in cases where the law compels or provides for such action.' ' °
According to the defendants, section 23902 was a law that provided for age
discrimination in connection with the eligibility requirements for a disability
allowance. 1 0 The plaintiff replied that the age discrimination ostensibly allowed
by Government Code section 12941(a) was void under a provision of the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").4 t t The ADEA prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of age and invalidates the terms of
employee benefit plans to the extent that they require or permit the involuntary
retirement of an employee on the basis of age.412 If, under the Supremacy Clause
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of the Federal Constitution, the ADEA voided the discrimination otherwise
permitted by Government Code section 12941(a), then the plaintiff could
maintain an action under section 12941(a) to redress an unlawful employment
practice4 3
41 4
In Smith, the court of appeal adopted the plaintiff's statutory interpretation.
The court determined that the section 23902 exclusion of disability benefits for
employees over the age of sixty forced the plaintiff in Smith to retire involuntarily
within the meaning of the ADEA.4 t5 Under the Supremacy Clause, the age
discrimination provisions of section 23902 were invalid insofar as they were
inconsistent with the ADEA.41 6 Therefore, the plaintiff had a valid cause of
action, under Government Code section 12941(a) for age discrimination. 41 7 The
court properly interpreted and applied the various federal and state statutes.
In Thorning v. HollisterSchool District,1 8 the court held that two retired
school board members had a vested right to the post-retirement continuation of
health and welfare benefits, even though the school district voted to terminate
such benefits for retirees.4 1 9 The plaintiffs were long-term members of the
Hollister School Board.4 20 Under a school board policy, the plaintiffs were
entitled, upon their retirement, to the continuation of health and welfare benefits. 42' At the first meeting after the plaintiffs retired, however, the new school
board voted to suspend payment of the post-retirement health and welfare benefits
for the plaintiffs.42 2 The appellate court held that the school district could not
unilaterally terminate those benefits because the benefits became vested when the
school board adopted its retirement benefits policy two and one-half years before
the plaintiffs retired.4z Moreover, the court also allowed the plaintiffs to maintain

a section 1983424 action against the new school board members because the
defendants acted under color of state law in depriving the plaintiffs of pension
rights, which were protected by the federal constitution.4 Thus, the court
intimated its view that it is serious business to deny retirement benefits to public
employees.
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C. The Sixth DistrictLikewise Showed No Discernible Preferencesin Its
LaborLaw Cases
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District decided only three cases pitting labor against
management. The court ruled in favor of the employer in two cases and the union
prevailed in the other case. Consequently, as with the employment law cases, the
only trend that can be divined in the court's labor law opinions is that it is no
longer benign to employers in most or all cases.
In Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys' Association v. Woodside
("SCCCAA"),4 the Sixth District held that an association, which represented
attorneys in the county counsel's office, could not sue the county to enforce the
attorneys' collective bargaining rights.4 27 The court determined that an attorney's
duty of loyalty to a client, as well as Rules of Professional Conduct 3-3004' and
430
3-310,429 prevented even a public attorney from suing his or her current client.
The court further concluded that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA"), 43,
which governs the collective bargaining rights of public employees in California,
4 32
did not authorize the attorneys' association to sue the county.
The California Supreme Court reversed the Sixth District's decision in
SCCCAA. 433 The supreme court first found that the MMBA does confer upon the
attorneys' association the right to pursue a mandamus action to remedy the
county's breach of its duty to bargain in good faith.4' The court also determined
that Rule 3-300 was inapplicable because the filing of a writ petition does not
constitute the acquisition of a pecuniary interest adverse to a client.435 Similarly,

Rule 3-310 did not apply because the association's writ petition would not create
a conflict with the client in matters where the county attorneys represented the
county.436 In balancing the attorneys' duty of loyalty and their collective bargaining rights, the court held that public sector attorneys do not violate their
ethical obligations to their client by bringing an action to enforce their collective
bargaining rights under the MMBA 3 7 Finally, the court ruled that a public
agency cannot terminate an in-house attorney exclusively or primarily on the

426.
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ground that he or she engaged in activities protected by the MMBA, such as
bringing a lawsuit to enforce collective bargaining rights.4 38
In UnitedFarm Workers v. AgriculturalLabor Relations Board,439 the Sixth
District addressed the issue of whether a grower, who had been found guilty of
refusing to bargain with his union employees in good faith, was required to
"make whole" his employees for all economic losses resulting from his violation
of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act. 40 By law, an employer might not be
liable for "make whole" damages, even though he or she has violated labor laws
by refusing to bargain: An exemption from "make whole" liability arises if the
employer proves that the parties would not have entered into a new collective

bargaining agreement notwithstanding the employer's unlawful refusal to
bargain.m ' The court of appeal found that there was sufficient evidence that the
grower was unable to meet the union's wage demands, and thus, the grower and
the union never would have reached a new collective bargaining agreement.4 42
Accordingly, the court affirmed the Agricultural 3Labor Relations Board's
decision denying "make whole" relief to the union."
In Michael Hat Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,"'4 the
Sixth District ruled in favor of the union in a labor law case. A former vineyard
owner had a collective bargaining agreement with the United Farm Workers. 4 5
That agreement expired." 6 The former owner sold the vineyards to a new owner
who hired the petitioner to manage the vineyards." 7 The union contended that the
petitioner refused to bargain with them after the agreement with the former
vineyard owner had expired. 48 The case turned on whether the petitioner could
be an agricultural employer when it did not own the agricultural land in question." 9 The court held that the petitioner was an agricultural employer because the
management agreement with the new owner gave the petitioner all the powers of
an employer and the petitioner exercised those powers.450 Having found that the
manager was an agricultural employer, the court affirmed the Agricultural Labor
Relations Board decision that, among other things, ordered the petitioner to
bargain with the union in good faith and pay "make whole" damages to certain
union members.4 '
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VII. ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE CASES
A. The Sixth DistrictDecidedIts Only CEQA CaseIn Favorof Government
Compliance with CEQA
Unlike prior years when the court passed upon environmental issues in
numerous cases,45 2 the Sixth District had occasion to apply CEQA in only one
case in 1991-1993. The court found that the government complied with CEQA
in that case.
In Kaufman & Broad-South Bay, Inc. v. Morgan Hill Unified School
District,5 3 the court of appeal determined that the challenged government action
was not a "project" under CEQA and thus, environmental review was unnecessary. 54 A local school district formed a "community facilities district" to assist
in financing future land acquisitions for new schools and for rehabilitating school
facilities. 4 5 The school district simultaneously passed a resolution stating that its
action did not constitute a project under CEQA because it had no potential for
directly or ultimately causing a physical change in the environment. 6 An interested party brought a lawsuit, alleging that the school district's "no project"
determination was erroneous because the formation of the community facilities
district necessarily would result in the construction of schools 5 7 The argument
did not convince the court of appeal. The Sixth District held that there was no
causal link between the school district's action and the construction of schools
because the formation of the community facilities district would not create a need
for new schools nor commit the school district to any particular option regarding
the construction of new schools 4 8 The court proposed (and applied in the case
before it) the following rule: "[W]here funding issues alone are involved, courts
should look for a binding commitment
to spend in a particular manner before
'4 9
requiring environmental review.A
Although it may have seemed counter-intuitive at first blush, the court's
decision was correct. The effect of the school district's action was limited to the
creation of a mechanism for generating revenues for undetermined future projects
that may never be built. ° Environmental review would be appropriate only when
the school district started along the path toward building one of the future
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B. The Sixth District's Decisions on the Enforceability of Land Use
Regulations Were Split Evenly
In 1991-1993, the court addressed land use issues in four cases. The results
in those cases reveal no trends. The court upheld the government action in two
cases and refused to enforce the regulations in the other two cases.
1. The Court Upheld the Government's Land Use Regulations in Two
Cases
In Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea

1

the court approved the city's

restrictions on residential property in the face of an array of constitutional challenges. The city's zoning ordinance prohibited owners of residential property
from renting the premises for pay for less than 30 consecutive days. 2 The plaintiffs-homeowners who rented out their homes to short-term guests-brought an
action attacking the validity of the ordinance.4 3 The court of appeal affirmed the
trial court's decision to uphold the ordinance.
Although a trial court had issued a permanent injunction restraining the city
from enforcing a similar ordinance eight years earlier, s the Sixth District, in
Ewing, concluded that collateral estoppel did not render the new ordinance
void.' The court based this decision on differences in the language between the
old and new ordinances, and on the right of a zoning authority to "try again" to
respond to different circumstances or different goals. 7 The appellate court also
determined that the ordinance did not result in an unconstitutional taking of the
plaintiffs' property because the plaintiffs still enjoyed numerous economic uses
of their property and, in any event, the burden on their property rights was far
outweighed by the city's interest in maintaining permanent residential neighborhoods.46 Next, the court found that the ordinance was neither vague nor overbroad because it was sufficiently clear to enable people to comprehend its
meaning.4 The court of appeal further decided that the ordinance passed muster
when measured against the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The
ordinance was rationally related to its objective to maintain the residential
character of certain districts in the city and thus, the ordinance presented no substantive due process problems. 470 Nor did the ordinance violate equal protection
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because the regulation prohibited all short-term commercial uses of residential
property for pay, not just certain types of commercial uses.47 Finally, the court
ruled that the ordinance did not unduly infiinge upon the plaintiffs' rights to
privacy and freedom of association. Unlike other cases where zoning restrictions
city's
unconstitutionally limited with whom a property user could reside, the
47 2
ordinance was valid because it focused on the use rather than the users.
The Sixth District's lengthy constitutional analysis in Ewing was flawless.
However, the court's application of the collateral estoppel doctrine raises questions that cannot be answered from a review of the court's opinion. The court
stated that collateral estoppel did not apply at all because the recent ordinance had
different wording compared with the earlier invalid ordinance. 73 But, the court
did not point to any differences in language that justified its conclusion. This
omission is troubling because the court acknowledged that the new ordinance had

the same intent and effect as the old ordinance! 4 Also, the court believed that
even if the collateral estoppel doctrine were a factor, the public policy exception
to that doctrine would apply because a city needs the power to adopt new zoning
regulations t6 address new situations and new objectives.475 Again, however, the
court did not specify any circumstances or goals that had changed in the city
between the invalidation of the earlier ordinance and the adoption of the new one.
In light of these omissions in the court's opinion, it is impossible to say whether
the court properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
In City of Los Altos v. Barnes,47 6 the court applied its rationale in Ewing477 to
reach a similar result. The city's zoning ordinance allowed residents to operate
businesses out of their homes in residential zones, but did not permit employment
in the home of persons who did not also reside there. The defendant performed
office-related functions in her home for an off-site recreational family camp
situated in another county.4 78 She employed others to assist her with the office
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resident of a low income public housing unit from residing with an unrelated member of the opposite sex,
constituted a denial of due process and a violation of equal protection).
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duties in her home, although the assistants did not live in the home."79 The city
sued the defendant to enforce the ordinance and obtained a preliminary injunction.4 80 On appeal, the defendant argued that the ordinance unconstitutionally
infringed upon her constitutional rights to privacy and free association.0 4 8'
As in Ewing, the Sixth District in City ofLos Altos rejected those arguments
because the challenged ordinance regulated the use rather than the users of the
defendant's property. 2 As the ordinance placed no restrictions on the identity of
the persons with whom the defendant could reside or the persons whom she could
employ, the ordinance did not impair the defendant's constitutional rights to
privacy and free association. 3 The court additionally concluded that the ordinance was not void for vagueness. Here, the court emphasized that the prohibitions
in the ordinance were clear, specific and rationally designed to preserve the
residential character of neighborhoods. 4' City of Los Altos was a sound variation
on the Ewing constitutional themes.
2. The Court Ruled Against the Government in Two Land Use Cases
In Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board,4 5 the court invalidated 48a6
portion of the developer fees that a school board assessed against the plaintiff.
The school board levied a "school facilities fee" on the plaintiff as a condition to
obtaining a building permit for the plaintiffs proposed development.47 The
developer paid the fees under protest and sued for a refund."8 ' The court of appeal
found that the amount of the fee imposed by the school board was unlawfully
excessive because the school board did not accurately compute either the portion
of its projected increase in student population or the portion of the total
anticipated cost of new school facilities that would be attributable to the plaintiff's new development.!8 9
The key issue in the case was the remedy. Government Code section
66020(e) directs the court, in a successful action challenging development fees,
"to refund the unlawful portion of the payment." 49 The plaintiff argued that the
court should invalidate the school board's entire school facilities fee resolution,
not just the application of the resolution to the plaintiff, and order a refund of all
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fees paid, not just the excessive amount.491 Here, the developer relied upon the
Second District Court of Appeal opinion in Bixel Associates v. City of Los
Angeles.492 In Bixel, the Second District struck down a fire hydrant fee that the
city assessed against developers of new projects because the city's method of
computing the fee was neither fair nor reasonable, and the city did not use the fees
solely for the installation and repair of fire protection equipment necessitated by
the new projects.493

In ShapellIndustries,the Sixth District refused to follow Bixel, and instead,
ordered a partial refund of only the excessive amount of the school facilities fee
paid by the plaintiff.4" The court stated that Bixel was not controlling because the
Bixel court did not consider the partial refund procedure set forth in Government
Code section 66020(e), did not involve school fees and, unlike the situation in
ShapellIndustries, did not specify whether the record was sufficient to enable the
court to compute a partial refund.495
As between Shapell Industries and Bixel, the Sixth District decision obviously is more faithful to Government Code section 66020(e). The Sixth District
properly declined to allow Bixel to serve as a guide in establishing the remedy in
Shapell Industries.
In People ex reL Department of Transportationv. Ad Way Signs, Inc.,496 the
court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the state in the state's action to
remove the defendant's billboard. The state granted a permit for the billboard in
1969, to be renewed annually.497 Although the billboard remained standing, the
defendant did nothing to renew the permit after 1983.498 In 1991, the state brought
its action for removal of the billboard based upon the contention, among others,
that the defendant maintained the billboard without a permit The trial court
granted summary judgment in light of its view that the expiration of the permit
in 1983 constituted a revocation. The appellate court rejected that theory,
observing that due process requires that the state provide a billboard owner with
a noticed hearing on the issue of revocation of the billboard permit.5"' The court
held that an expired billboard permit cannot become automatically revoked and
thus, the trial court erred in finding a revocation based on the defendant's failure
to renew the permit after 1983.52
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In a subsequent case, the California Supreme Court cited the Sixth District's
Ad Way Signs opinion with approval for the proposition that an expired billboard
permit is not automatically invalid because the billboard owner has due process
rights prior to revocation of the permit °3
VIII. REAL PROPERTY LAW CASES

The real property law cases decided by the Sixth District in 1991-1993
constituted a motley group. The court addressed a small number of cases in each
of several different areas, including the anti-deficiency laws, purchase and sale
agreements, broker's commissions and landlord-tenant disputes. Overall, the
court's decisions in real property law cases showed no marked tendencies.
A. The Decisions in the Court's Two Anti-Deficiency Law Cases Revealed
No Definite Currents
The court construed and applied the California anti-deficiency laws in two
cases. The court enforced those laws in one case and found them inapplicable in
the other case.
In Rettner v. Shepherd,5°4 the plaintiff obtained a judgment of $366,118.53
against the defendant 0 5 Later, the plaintiff took a note in the amount of
$518,065.85 secured by a deed of trust from a corporation that the defendant had
formed and partly owned. 5' The note recited that its face amount "represents the
money judgment, together with interest and costs." 50 7 The note further provided
that the defendant and his brother were jointly and severally liable for the amount
of the judgment.' When the defendant defaulted on the note, the plaintiff, in lieu
of foreclosure, agreed to accept a new note from a partnership in which the
defendant's corporation was a partner, secured by a deed of trust on the same
property.5°9 The new note did not contain the joint and several liability provision
that appeared in the prior note.510 In return, the plaintiff agreed to cancel the prior
note and deed of trust."' Ultimately, the plaintiff foreclosed nonjudicially under
the power of sale in his deed of trust5 1 Thereafter, the trial court granted the
plaintiff's motions aimed at continuing his enforcement of judgment efforts.
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Reversing the trial court's ruling in Rettner, the Sixth District held that Code
of Civil Procedure section 580d precluded the plaintiff from any recovery beyond
the nonjudicial foreclosure." Section 580d prohibits ajudgment for a deficiency
on an unpaid note secured by a deed of trust on real property where the security
has been sold nonjudicially under the deed of trust."1 4 Given that the plaintiff had
pursued a nonjudicial foreclosure under his deed of trust, section 580d barred his
subsequent enforcement of judgment effortsO 5 The court of appeal had no
sympathy for the plaintiff's argument that he was an unsecured judgment creditor

who received "additional security" for the judgment and thus, he held the bundle
of rights of a judgment creditor without the restrictions of the anti-deficiency
laws. 51 6 As a result of the plaintiff's acceptance of the first note and deed of trust,
the court determined that he became a secured creditor 17 Nor did the appellate
court find significance in the joint and several liability provision in the first note
that kept the defendant on the hook.51 8 Rather, the court concluded that that
provision was an unlawful attempt to circumvent section 58d 9
The court's application of section 580d in Rettner was correct. The court
aptly summarized the case as follows: the plaintiff could have chosen to remain
an unsecured judgment creditor or could have elected to become a secured
creditor; there was no third choice whereby he could have enjoyed the benefits
held by a secured creditor without the burdens imposed by the anti-deficiency
laws.520
In FirstNationwide Savings v. Perry,2' the court refused to apply the antideficiency laws to bar a claim for unjust enrichment. The defendant purchased
real property, which had been secured by a deed of trust, at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale subject to the plaintiff's purchase money first deed of trust.522 Before
the recordation of the defendant's trustee's deed upon sale, a reconveyance of the
plaintiff's first deed of trust was executed and recorded by mistake. 5' The defendant sold the property and pocketed the proceeds of the sale without any payment
to the plaintiff.524 The plaintiff brought an action for unjust enrichment 5 ' The
defendant raised an anti-deficiency law defense under Code of Civil Procedure
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section 580b. 52 He argued that the plaintiff's recovery for unjust enrichment
effectively would constitute a deficiency judgment because the plaintiff's purchase money security was exhausted and it nonetheless would receive a judgment
in the full amount of its secured loan.5 27
The Sixth District refused to allow the defendant to use the anti-deficiency
laws as a shield in FirstNationwide Savings. The court explained that a recovery
for unjust enrichment was not the same as a recovery of a deficiency judgment,
especially where the plaintiff cannot foreclose because its lien has been extinguished. s28Even if the plaintiff's judgment for unjust enrichment were tantamount
to a deficiency judgment, according to the court, equity in this case demanded
that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim take precedence over the defendant's
anti-deficiency law defense.529 The Sixth District thereby created a new equitable

exception to the anti-deficiency laws. As the defendant simply sought to keep a
windfall, the court's refusal to apply the bar of the anti-deficiency laws was
entirely proper. The new equitable exception should be applied only in cases, like
FirstNationwide Savings, with peculiar facts.
B. The Court Ruled Against the Sellers in Two Cases Involving Purchase
and Sale Agreements
The court confronted two cases where a seller of real property was at odds
with its buyer. The court decided both cases in favor of the buyer.
In Stevens Group FundIVy. Sobrato Development Co.,530 the Sixth District
reversed the trial court's decision to deny a specific performance claim in
litigation with a novel set of facts. The defendants sold commercial real property
to the plaintiff."3 ' There was an existing loan on the property that, by agreement,
could not be prepaid.532 The purchase and sale contract required the defendants
to convey title free and clear.533 After the agreement was exectted, the creditor
on the existing loan refused to accept prepayment. 'The plaintiff declined to take
title subject to the existing loan,5 35 and commenced an action for specific
performance. By the time of trial, the defendants had paid off the existing loan.
The trial court refused to grant specific performance to the plaintiff because the
defendants had not been able to perform the agreement at the time of sale. In

See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1994) (stating that no deficiency judgment shall lie
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doing so, the trial court applied Civil Code section 3390, which provides that
"[a]n agreement to perform an act which the party has not power
lawfully to
536
perform when required to do so" cannot be specifically enforced.
In Stevens Group, the court of appeal construed section 3390 to permit an
award of specific performance where the seller had the power to perform the
contract at the time of trial.537 The court reasoned that its interpretation would
broaden the trial court's equitable powers and promote the performance of contracts.538 Although the case was as close as it was unusual, the Sixth District's
construction and application of Civil Code section 3390 seems reasonable.
In EPA Real Estate Partnershipv. Kang,39 the court of appeal interpreted a
purchase and sale contract for the benefit of the buyer. The plaintiff listed one of
its properties with a broker.' Before the expiration of the listing agreement, the
defendant sent an offer directly to one of the plaintiff's partners, bypassing the

broker."I The two parties signed a written agreement whereby the plaintiff would
sell the property to the defendant on the day after the broker's listing agreement
expired, and the defendant would release the plaintiff "from harm and liability of
current listing." 2 After the listing agreement expired, the plaintiff and the
defendant signed a new purchase and sale agreement that contained an integration
clause, but no indemnification provision concerning the listing agreement. 3 The
plaintiff transferred the property to the defendant and the broker later pursued a
claim for a commission.'
In a separate action, the broker obtained an arbitration award and judgment
against the seller (i.e., the plaintiff in EPA Real Estate) for approximately
$250,000 and the plaintiff incurred approximately $40,000 in litigation costs in
that action. 5 In EPA Real Estate, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of
contract to recover the $290,000 that the plaintiff owed to the broker.1 6 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the earlier
hold harmless agreement based upon the integration clause in the final
purchase
7
defendant.
the
for
judgment
entered
later
and
agreement
sale
and
On appeal, the Sixth District affirmed, concluding that the earlier hold
harmless agreement related to the sale of the property at issue and thus, came
within the scope of the integration clause in the final purchase and sale
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agreement. 48 For this reason, the court dismissed the plaintiff's contentions that
the earlier hold harmless agreement was separate and distinct from the final
agreement and that the final agreement concerned only the details of the purchase
and sale, and not indemnificationO'9
The court's application of the law regarding integrated contracts was correct
because the prior hold harmless agreement was inextricably related to and a part
of the purchase and sale of the property. The final terms of the purchase and sale
ultimately were reduced to writing in the final contract that contained an integration clause that voided all prior agreements, including the earlier hold harmless
agreement.
C. The Sixth DistrictDecided One Broker's Commission Case in Favor of
the Broker
In the Sixth District's sole case involving a broker's right to a commission,
the broker prevailed.
In Chan v. Tsang,"' a broker was retained by an individual who was
" ' The broker located a partiinterested in purchasing commercial real property.55
cular property, the buyer made an offer and the seller accepted the offer052 The

broker anticipated a $100,000 commission in light of the $4,000,000 purchase

price.553 Under the purchase agreement, the seller could keep the buyer's $20,000
deposit, upon the buyer's default.' The agreement further specified that the
broker could collect a commission from the seller, upon the buyer's default, only
after the seller collected damages from the buyer, that the commission would be
limited to one-half of the damages recovered by the seller 5 The buyer backed
out of the transaction. 55 The seller sued the buyer and obtained and collected on
a $20,000 judgment (i.e., the deposit).557 In the broker's action against the buyer,
the trial court limited the broker's recovery to $10,000-half of the damages
collected by the seller.558
The court of appeal in Chan held that the broker was entitled to the entire
$100,000 commission 5 9 Although a seller usually pays all broker's commissions, a buyer can become liable for a commission to the buyer's broker for
failing to complete a purchase and sale of real property where the broker has

548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

Id. at 176-77, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
Id.
1 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (1991).
Chan, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 1580, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
Id. at 1581, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
Id. at 1581-82, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15-16.
Id. at 1581, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
Id.
Id. at 1582, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
Id.
Id.

559.

Id. at 1583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
located the property for the buyer and the seller has accepted the buyer's offer to
purchase the property. 560 The foundation for the buyer's liability, under these
circumstances, is that: (a) the buyer has breached an implied promise to complete
the transaction that would enable the broker to receive the commission and (b) the
broker is a third party beneficiary of the agreement between the seller and the
buyer.5 6' The court also noted that the commission provision in the purchase
agreement did not control or limit the broker's rights as to the buyer because that
provision related only to the duty of the seller to pay the broker's commission. 62
Once again, the Sixth District's rationale and result seem correct.
D. The CourtResolved One Out of Two Landlord-TenantCases in Favorof
Landlords
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District addressed only two landlord-tenant cases.
The landlord lost one case, but prevailed in the other.
In Casellav. City ofMorgan Hillm3 the court upheld the validity of the city's

mobile home rent control ordinance. The ordinance allowed no rent increases, not
even upon a tenant's departure following the sale of his or her coach. The
owners of a mobile home park within the city commenced an action, attacking the
ordinance for unconstitutionally taking their property 65 They argued that the
effect of the rent control ordinance was to increase the sale prices for coaches
within the park by reducing the cost of the space on which they rested. This
effect, according to the plaintiffs, resulted in the transfer, from the landlords to the
tenants, of the valuable property interest flowing from the tenants' right to occupy
a park space at reduced rent'
The Sixth District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case at the
5 67 Although it acknowledged
demurrer stage in Casella.
that the rent control
ordinance benefits tenants by operating to increase the sale prices for coaches, the
court refused to recognize that anything was taken from the mobile home park
owners.56 By way of illustration, the court suggested that the increased sale
prices for coaches following the imposition of a rent control ordinance may
reflect the artificially low prices for coaches resulting from excessive rents
charged before the adoption of the ordinance. 9 Throughout its opinion, the court
expressed its agreement with the Fourth District's opinion in Yee v. City of
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EscondidoY° On the other hand, the Sixth District rebuked the decision and

rationale in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara," in which the Ninth Circuit held that

a similar ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking.572 The Sixth District

complained that Halltried to shoehorn a purely economic regulation into the very
narrow concept of a "physical occupation" to obtain the result that the challenged

ordinance constituted a taking per se.57s

The Ninth Circuit responded to the criticism by attempting to establish the
federal courts as a safe harbor for mobile home park owners with "taking" claims

based on rent control ordinances. In SierraLake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 74 the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that California state appellate courts, in Casellaand

Yee, rejected the Hall theory of compensation for a taking in cases involving
mobile home park rent control ordinances without vacancy decontrol provisions. 575 As a result, the Ninth Circuit announced that state appellate courts are
not available to provide compensation in that situation and thus, a mobile home
park owner can bring a taking claim directly to federal court without first seeking
relief in California state courts.5 76 However, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sierra Lake Reserve and ordered

reconsideration in light of the former court's decision in Yee.'

On remand, the
578

Ninth Circuit vacated the taking portion of its opinion in SierraLake Reserve.
Moreover, two Ninth Circuit decisions have recognized that the high court's

decision in Yee overruled Hall.579 Accordingly, the Sixth District's decision and
rationale in Casella,including the criticism of Hall,has proven correct, inasmuch
as the United States Supreme Court has approved the result and reasoning in

Casella.580
The Sixth District ruled for the landlord (and evicting sheriff) in Cardenas
v. Noren.81 The plaintiff was a tenant and a named defendant in an underlying
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unlawful detainer action, but he was never served with the complaint, nor was he
named in the default judgment. 3 2 At the conclusion of the unlawful detainer
action, the sheriff evicted the plaintiff, as well as the other tenant named in the
judgment.583 The plaintiff could have objected to enforcement of the unlawful
detainer judgment as to him by filing a claim of right to possession in the trial
court, but he did not do so.584 Instead, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
mandate directing the sheriff to restore the plaintiff to possession of the leased
property. 585 The court of appeal acknowledged that an eviction without notice or
a hearing violates due process.5 86 Yet, the court decided that the eviction was
proper, even though the plaintiff had neither notice nor a hearing. The Sixth
District concluded that the plaintiff should have filed a claim of right to
possession, as permitted by section 1174.3(a), in order to obtain the right to be
heard with counsel regarding the plaintiffs right to possession of the leased
premises.5 8 In view of the plaintiff's failure to file the claim, the court held that
the sheriff lawfully evicted the plaintiff?' 8
The court's application of section 1174.3(a), although undeniably true to the
statute, was quite harsh. The court accurately stated that the plaintiff could have
and should have filed a claim of right to possession rather than a petition for writ
of mandate. Given that the plaintiff diligently pursued his writ petition within two
weeks of his eviction, 58 9 both the trial and appellate courts should have treated his
petition as a claim of right to possession or allowed the plaintiff to amend his
pleading so that he could invoke the proper procedure.

IX. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
A. The Sixth DistrictVigorously Defended FirstAmendment Rights in Two
Cases
In 1991-1993, as in past years, the Sixth District was a staunch defender of
First Amendment liberties. In one freedom of speech case and in one freedom of
the press case, the court enforced First Amendment rights in both cases.
In Clark v. Burleigh,59 the court struck down, on First Amendment grounds,
a statute regulating the content of a political candidate's statement in a voter's
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pamphlet. A candidate for a superior court judgeship submitted a statement for
inclusion in a voter's pamphlet that was critical of the incumbent. 5 9' The county
registrar of voters filed a declaratory relief action to obtain a determination of
whether the statement violated Elections Code section 10012.1092 That statute

limits the statements of judicial candidates to a 200-word maximum "recitation

of the candidate's own personal background and qualifications," prohibits any
"reference to other candidates for judicial office or to another candidate's
the county clerk to strike any
qualifications, character or activities," and allows
5 93
portion of a statement that violates the statute.
Based upon an application of the United States Supreme Court's "public
' the Sixth District, in Clark,held that section 10012.1 violated
forum" doctrine,594
the judicial candidate's constitutional right to free speech.595 The court first found
that the voter's pamphlet was a limited public forum-rather than a public forum
or a non-public forum-because it was a forum that the state created to promote
the discussion of certain subjects."' The court of appeal also determined that the
statute restricted speech based upon content by limiting the subject of a candidate's statement, as opposed to regulating merely the time, place and manner
of speech.597 Although it recognized that the statute promotes the compelling
interests of judicial integrity and impartiality, the court decided that section
10012.1 was not narrowly tailored to further those interests because the statute
prohibited even true, neutral and laudatory statements regarding a candidate's
opponent.5 98 Not only did it conclude that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad, but the appellate court additionally held that section 10012.1 operated
as an impermissible prior restraint on speech s99 Ultimately, the court declared
that "section 10012.1 represents, quite simply, government censorship in its most
pernicious form." 6 °
The California Supreme Court did not view section 10012.1 the same way,
however, as it reversed the Sixth District's decision in Clark. °' The supreme
court disagreed with the Sixth District's application of the "public forum"
doctrine with respect to the entire voter's pamphlet. The supreme court concluded
that the relevant "forum" was only the candidate's statement within the voter's

pamphlet, not the entire voter's pamphlet.6 Next, the supreme court determined

591.
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that the Legislature did not intentionally create the candidate's statement in voter
pamphlets in order to open a public forum that judicial candidates could use to
attack their opponents. Therefore, the candidate's statement was not a public

forum or a limited public forum, but instead, a non-public forum.

3

Under the controlling test for a non-public forum-whether the challenged
statute is reasonably related to its purposes-the supreme court found that the
statute was valid.' According to the supreme court, the objective of section
10012.1 is to provide voters with basic information regarding the qualifications
of unfamiliar judicial candidates. 6°5 In light of that purpose, the statute's
prohibition on attacks on opponents is reasonable for two reasons. First, the
allowance of attacks would reduce the effectiveness of the candidate's statements
because such attacks would distract voters, detract from the speaker's 200-word
statement of his or her own qualifications, and create the incentive for every candidate to engage in attacks. 606 Second, the statutory restriction on speech applies
only to the candidate's statements within the voter's pamphlet and does not affect
any other speech by a judicial candidate. °
In James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,6 the court of appeal ruled in favor
of a newspaper publisher in a libel case. The allegedly libelous publication was
an article that criticized the tactics of a deputy public defender in a case involving
a child victim.6w The key ruling on appeal actually went against the publisher:
The court concluded that a deputy public defender was not a public official for
the purposes of the defendants' First Amendment defense to the plaintiff's libel
case. 611 In this regard, the Sixth District specifically disagreed with the holding
of another court in Tague v. Citizens for Law and Order,Inc.611 In light of its
conclusion, the Sixth District refused to allow the defendants to raise, as a shield,
the "actual malice" standard that applies in public official cases (i.e., a publication
is not libelous unless it was published with
knowledge that it was false or with
62
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity).

Nonetheless, the court inJames found that the subject matter of the article did
concern issues of public interest and thus, invoked qualified constitutional
safeguards that protect the media's publication of articles involving private persons and issues of public interest.63t As a result, the applicable test was whether
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604. Id. at 493-95, 841 P.2d at 987-88, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467-68; see Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S.
788, 808 (1985) (establishing the test for a non-public forum).
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the article, as a whole or by any of its parts, asserted or implied a false statement
of fact that tended to harm the plaintiffs reputation.61 4 Ultimately, the court
decided that every statement in the article was a non-actionable opinion or a
factual statement that was probably not false and that the article, taken as a whole,
did not convey a false and defamatory message 1 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the media defendants 6
In James, the Sixth District's application of the public interest test was
entirely proper. The determinative issue was whether the court applied the correct
test. In Tague, the court opined that a public defender was a public official
because a public defender performed a government function, had discretionary

control over his or her caseload and performed services relating to matters of

significant public concern 7 The Sixth District could not agree, finding that a
deputy public defender (a) did not have considerable responsibility or control
over governmental affairs, and (b) hardly differed from a private criminal defense
attorney, except for the identity of the attorney's employer 1 Here, the Sixth
District correctly refused to follow Tague. Although he or she may have control
over individual cases, a public defender does not exercise control over public
policy to any meaningful degree. The Sixth District correctly decided that a
public defender is not a public official for the purposes of First Amendment
analysis.
B. The Sixth DistrictInvalidateda New Tax by Virtue of the Proposition13
Supermajority Requirement in Two Out of Three Cases
In 1991-1993, the Sixth District passed upon the validity of a new tax in three
cases. In all three cases, the opponents of the tax relied upon the supermajority
requirement of Proposition 13, whereby a new special tax must be adopted by a
vote of two-thirds of the electorate. In two significant cases, the court voided tax
measures, on Proposition 13 grounds, which would have provided financing for
major public improvement projects. In the third case, the court dismissed the
Proposition 13 challenge to the taxing measure.
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1. The CourtStruck Down Tax Measureson ConstitutionalGrounds in
Two Cases
In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
("SCCLTA",),6 19 the Sixth District, in a 2-1 decision, invalidated a sales tax
adopted by Santa Clara County voters to finance numerous major transportation
projects. The county historically paid for transportation projects and services
through revenues other than property taxes.6 For many years prior to the vote
in question, the county's source of funds for public transportation costs came

from a one-half cent sales tax, which the voters had approved and which never
had been challenged in court.6" Before that sales tax expired, a private citizens
coalition spearheaded a campaign for the passage of another half-cent sales tax
measure to continue the sales tax funding for transportation projects. The
replacement sales tax would finance projects designated in a transportation plan
drafted by the citizens coalition.6 As required by law to place the sales tax
measure on the ballot, the citizens coalition obtained from the county and 15
cities within the county the approval of the coalition's transportation plan and a
coalition-drafted resolution creating a new local transportation agency (i.e., the
plaintiff).62 The county's voters passed the measure by a 54% majority. The
new transportation agency brought an original proceeding in the court of appeal
to establish the validity of the tax.!26
The Sixth District majority's decision in SCCLTA turned on its interpretation
of the California Supreme Court's opinion in Rider v. County of San Diego.62 In
Rider, the supreme court voided a sales tax, which county voters had passed by
a majority of less than two-thirds, to finance the construction of jails and courthouse facilities. 6' In Rider, as in SCCLTA, the court interpreted section 4 of
Proposition 13, which provides that cities, counties and "special districts" may
impose "special taxes" by a two-thirds vote of the electorate.6 29 The supreme
court observed in Rider that the purpose of section 4 was to limit the ability of
government to establish new taxes to replace lost property tax revenues resulting
from the operation of Proposition 13.630 The supreme court concluded: "[W]e
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24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854 (1993), review granted andopinion superseded,866 P.2d 1311, 27 Cal. Rptr.

2d 488 (1994). Although the author had no involvement in this case, one of his partners represented petitioner

Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority inthe proceedings.
620.

SCCLTA, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.

621.

Id.

622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.

Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id.
1 Cal. 4th 1,820 P.2d 1000, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490 (1991).
Rider, I Cal. 4th at 5, 820 P.2d at 1002, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492.

629.

CAL. CONST., art. XIIIA, § 4.

630.

Rider, I Cal. 4th at 7, 11, 820 P.2d at 1003, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493.

1994 / Sixth Appellate District1991-1993
hold that 'special district' would include any local taxing agency created to raise
funds for city or county purposes to replace revenues lost by reason of the
restrictions of Proposition 13. ' 63t
In Rider, the supreme court determined that the evidence of the county's
intentional circumvention of Proposition 13 was strong because the county
created and controlled the new taxing agency.6 32 Recognizing that future cases

may present more subtle facts, the supreme court announced that a court may
infer a public entity's intentional circumvention of Proposition 13 where the new
taxing agency, created by the ballot measure, is "essentially controlled" by one
or more cities or counties which would have been forced to comply with the twothirds vote requirement of section 4633 The court listed six factors that may be
relevant to a determination of the existence of essential control: (1) The existing
public entity's substantial control over the new agency's operations, revenues, or
expenditures; (2) the existing public entity's ownership or control over the new
agency's property or facilities; (3) coterminous geographical boundaries of the
existing public entity and the new agency; (4) common or overlapping governing
boards of the existing public entity and the new agency; (5) the existing public
entity's involvement in the formation of the new agency; and (6) the new
agency's carrying out of activities historically performed by the existing public
entity and financed through property taxes. 6
In SCCLTA, the majority of the Sixth District Court of Appeal expressly
refused to apply the Rider six-part test for essential control. 6 35 The majority
opinion stated that the essential control test was a suggested mechanism that a
court may or may not use to determine whether a new taxing agency, established
by a vote of the electorate, constituted a special district for the purposes of
section 4 of Proposition 13.636 The majority, instead, focused on the elements
within the Rider definition of special district (viz., "any local taxing agency
created to raise funds for city or county purposes to replace revenues lost by
reason of the restrictions of Proposition 13").637 The majority quickly determined
that the SCCLTA was a local taxing agency which would use sales tax revenues
for city or county purposes.638 Under the majority's analysis, the case had two
pivotal issues: (a) whether the new agency would raise funds to replace revenues
lost by virtue of the limitations of Proposition 13; and (b) whether the new agency
was created for that purpose.639
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On the first issue, the majority, in SCCLA, found wanting the evidence that
the county historically funded public transportation projects through sources other
than property taxes, including the fact that the ballot measure essentially would
continue an existing source of sales tax revenues in the county. The majority
ruled that the appropriate test was whether property taxes "could as readily have
been used to fund the public transportation projects."' Applying that test, the
majority concluded that the county's transportation projects and services could
have been financed through real property taxes and thus, the ballot measure under
scrutiny replaced revenues lost by Proposition 13. 6"
On the second issue, the majority, in SCCLTA, was not impressed by the
evidence that a private group, rather than public officials, was the moving force
behind the formation of the new taxing agency 6 " Rather, the majority found

more significant the facts that the private group sought to form the new local
taxing agency based upon a consideration of-and inferentially an intent to
evade-the supreme court's Rider decision. The court also found it significant
that, rather than simply consult with the existing county transit district regarding
the desired transportation projects, the group chose instead to form a new taxing
agency. 64 For this reason, the majority decided that the private group's intention
to circumvent Proposition 13 was "readily apparent." 64 After finding that the new
sales tax would constitute a special tax within the meaning of section 4, the
majority invalidated the sales tax established by the ballot measure because the
tax was not passed by two-thirds of the voters.'
In SCCLTA, one justice filed a spirited dissenting opinion. The dissenter
agreed that the salient issues were the two issues identified in the majority
opinion. 7 The dissenter pointed out that the new tax merely would maintain the
current level of sales taxes following the expiration of the existing sales tax for
public transportation. 6" The revenues from the new tax would be used for the
same purpose as the sales tax that was about to expire: financing public transportation projects. 6" The existing sales tax would expire by operation of law
rather than by virtue of the property tax relief afforded by Proposition 13.650 In
view of those facts, the dissenter stated that the new sales tax could not be a tax
created to replace lost property tax revenues.6 5' The dissenter also emphasized
that the majority opinion's test for the replacement of lost property taxes
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factor-that property taxes could have been used to fund the public projects that
the challenged tax was designed to finance-would apply to any new tax because
the government can use real property taxes to finance any government purpose. e 2
After applying the six-part Rider test for essential control,653 the dissenter
concluded that the new sales tax was valid.
The California Supreme Court granted review in SCCLTA.655 The supreme
court will need to determine, among other things, whether the court of appeal
majority opinion or the dissenting opinion is more faithful to Rider. On the issue
of the replacement of lost property taxes factor, the SCCLTA majority opinion
suggested that the supreme court, in Rider, "patently agreed" with the view,
expressed by Justice Richardson in a dissenting opinion in an earlier supreme
court case,6 6 that a new agency was a special district if the new agency "sought
to impose a sales tax to generate funds for ordinary public services that could as
readily have been funded by a county real property tax, but for the limitations of
Proposition 3.6s7 However, it seems clear that the majority opinion's quotation
from the Rider opinion merely was a characterization of Justice Richardson's
dissenting opinion, not the standard that the supreme court adopted in Rider.658
In its holding and in its recapitulation of prior holdings, the supreme court, in
Rider, focused on a public agency's intention to raise funds to replace "lost"
property tax revenues; the court did not indicate that a new tax was questionable
if it were used for any purpose for which property taxes could be used.659 Thus,
the dissenting opinion in SCCLTA correctly stated that Rider rejected Justice

Richardson's
approach in favor of a more restrictive definition of a special
'
district.

In SCCLTA, the dissenting opinion aptly observed that no new tax could meet
the standard proposed by the majority opinion because property taxes could be
used for virtually any government purpose.6' If a new taxing agency is a special
district even though existing public entities never used property taxes to finance
the public projects that the new tax would fund, then it is difficult to imagine any
new tax that would be valid under the majority opinion's standard, unless twothirds of the electorate approved the tax.
Furthermore, if an effort to conform to the requirements of Rider constitutes
evidence of an intentional circumvention of Proposition 13, then again, no new
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tax would be valid without the approval of two-thirds of the voters. Either Rider
was considered and an intentional circumvention of Proposition 13 will be found,
or Rider was not considered and, as a result, the new tax will fail the Rider test.
Unless it is prepared to rule that all new taxes must meet the supermajority
requirement of Proposition 13, the supreme court will not be able to adopt the
reasoning of the majority opinion in SCCLTA.
In Monterey PeninsulaTaxpayersAssociation v. County of Monterey,662 the
Sixth District again invalidated a sales tax passed by a simple majority of the
voters in a county-here, to finance 27 specific construction and repair projects in
the county.6 3 Applying the Rider six-part test,66 the court of appeal decided that
the county had essential control over the new taxing agency and thus, the latter
agency was a special district within the meaning of section 4 of Proposition 13. 60
The court further determined that the new tax was a special tax, even though the
sales tax revenues would be used to finance 27 different projects.6 In this regard,
the appellate court specifically found that the stacking of a group of specific taxes
for specific projects does not transform the taxes into general taxes because
general taxes are available for any and all government purposes.6 7 Finally,
although the county invited the court to rule that special taxes are only those new
taxes that are designated for projects that property taxes previously financed, the
court declined the invitation and refused to utilize a historical tracing method for
determining whether a new tax is a special tax.66'

In the Monterey case, the Sixth District's application of the six-part Ridertest
for essential control was proper.6 9 As the court pointed out, the county created
the new taxing agency to impose the sales tax and mandated that the new agency
spend up to a certain amount on projects that the county had selected. 670
Therefore, the evidence of essential control in the Monterey case was quite
compelling. Interestingly, the court suggested in a footnote that the new agency
might no longer be a "special district" if the county restructured and surrendered
essential control over the new agency.671 In SCCLTA, the two-judge majority
repudiated that suggestion to the extent that it implied that "essential control" was
a necessary element of a special district.6 72
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In Monterey, the court's determination regarding the special tax issue was
consistent with Rider6 3 because Ridernoted that virtually every tax imposed by

a special district likely would be a special tax.674 Consequently, the historical
tracing approach should not be applicable for determining whether a new tax is
a "special tax." Contrary to the Sixth District's reading of Rider in Monterey,675
however, the historical tracing approach should have utility in a case, like
SCCLTA, where the issue is whether a new taxing agency is a "special district"
for the purposes of section 4 of Proposition 13.
2. The Court Upheld the Constitutionalityof a New Tax in One Case
In Evans v. City of San Jose,676 the Sixth District addressed whether the city's
adoption of an ordinance imposing a business tax to further general downtown
promotion ran afoul of the supermajority requirement of Proposition 13. The
court concluded that the business tax was not a permissible regulatory fee
whereby a public entity may charge reasonable fees in connection with regulatory
activities. 67 Nor was the new tax a special assessment whereby a public entity
can tax those within a local district for the cost of a permanent public
improvement therein.6 78 Nonetheless, the court of appeal held that the city's
business tax was valid under the same rationale that legitimates regulatory fees
and special assessments. 9 As the court found, the city imposed the tax to finance
downtown promotion on those who would receive the special benefit generated
by the tax.680 In fact, the Sixth District recognized that the tax would have been
invalid under Proposition 13 if the city had imposed it upon the entire public
because local businesses-not the general public in the city-would benefit
specially from the use of the tax funds.('8 In this somewhat novel case, the Sixth
District reached the correct result.
X. APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL DISMISSAL STATUTES

In the past, the Sixth District never hesitated to apply a dismissal statute so
as to bar a plaintiff's claim without a hearing on the merits.' In 1991-1993, this
trend continued. In three cases involving the application of a dismissal statute, the
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court enforced the statute and deprived the plaintiff of his or her action. In a
fourth case, the court reversed a judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff.
A. The CourtApplied DismissalStatutes Against Plaintiffs in Three Cases

In Watts v. Crawford,"3 the Sixth District affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiffs' action for failure to serve summons within three years. Under
applicable statutes, a court must dismiss an action if summons is not timely
served.' A plaintiff must serve summons upon a defendant within three years of
the filing of the complaint." 5 The three-year period is tolled during any period of
time where the defendant was not amenable to service of process.6 In Watts, the
plaintiffs obtained an order for service of summons by publication two days
before the third anniversary of the filing of their complaint. 87 In issuing that
order, the trial court found that the defendant "cannot be served with reasonable
diligence in any other manner." 8 However, as service by publication requires
four weeks, 689 the trial court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the action for failure to serve summons within three years. 6 ° On appeal,
the plaintiffs argued that the trial court's prior finding that the defendant could not
be served with reasonable diligence in any manner other than publication
constituted a finding that the defendant was not amenable to service of summons
and thus, the three-year period was tolled.69'
In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth District rejected the plaintiffs' argument in Watts.
The majority first noted that reasonable diligence does not justify a plaintiff's
failure to serve summons within the required period.692 More to the point, the
majority reasoned that a defendant's amenability to service of summons is not
dictated by the plaintiff's success or failure in effectuating service of process on
the defendant. 693 Rather, a defendant is not amenable to service of process for any
given period of time only where due process would prevent a court from
6
exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant during that period of time. 4
Consequently, the majority ruled that there was no inconsistency between the trial
court's initial finding that the defendant could not be served with reasonable
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diligence and a subsequent finding that the defendant was amenable to service of
process throughout the three-year period. 6 95 The majority expressly rejected as
"incorrect' the contrary decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Quaranta
v. Merlini.696 In Watts, there was a dissenter who contended that Quarantawas
not incorrect and that the judgment should have been reversed in Watts.697
The supreme court granted review in Watts, undoubtedly to resolve the
conflict between Quaranta and Watts. At first blush, the Sixth District's
distinction between the two separate trial court findings seems razor thin. As the
court held in Quarantaand as the plaintiffs argued in Watts, a defendant does not
seem amenable to service of process if the defendant cannot be served with
reasonable diligence. At the same time, a defendant logically would be amenable
to service of process by publication, even though the defendant cannot be served
with reasonable diligence in any manner other than by publication. For this
reason, the supreme court might overrule Quaranta and decide that the Sixth
District's decision in Watts was correct. Given that it simply could have
depublished the Watts opinion, the supreme court may have granted review in
Watts because, although Watts was decided correctly, Watts created the conflict
in authority with Quaranta.
In Bishop v. Silva,698 the Sixth District again dismissed a plaintiff's action
under the three-year service of summons statute." The plaintiff filed an action
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on the job.7oc His employer's
worker's compensation insurer filed a complaint in intervention.7 1 The plaintiff
failed to serve summons within three years and the trial court dismissed his
action.7o 2 Thereafter, the plaintiff attempted to intervene back into the action,
under Labor Code section 3853, because the insurer's action still was pending. 3
Section 3853 provides that an employee, employer, or employer's insurer may,
at any time before trial, intervene in the other's action against a third party

defendant. 4 The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to intervene.70 5
In affirming the trial court's judgment of dismissal, the Sixth District
concluded that an employer or employee, who initiates an action, cannot escape
the penalty for failing to serve summons within three years by intervening back
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234 Cal. App. 3d 1317,285 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1991).
699.
See supranotes 684-686 (describing the three year service of summons statute).
700.
Bishop, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1319-21,285 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12.
701.
Id. at 1321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
702.
Id. at 1320,285 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
703.
Id. at 1320-21,285 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
704.
CAL LAB. CODE § 3853 (West 1989); see also id. § 3850(b) (West 1989) (including insurer within
the definition of employer).
705.
Bishop, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
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into the litigation, after a third party has intervened. 7°6 The court recognized that
its decision was squarely at odds with the Second District's decision in Buell v.
CBS, Inc.7" The Sixth District explained its refusal to follow Buell by
emphasizing that Buell was decided before the effective date of the Legislature's
extensive amendments to the service of summons statutes. 0 3 The new statutes
established a strict scheme with few exceptions and eliminated, as an excuse, the
plaintiff's diligence in attempting to serve summons. 9 Even though the Buell
decision rested upon the unconditional right to intervene in section 3853, rather
than upon a "liberal" interpretation of the summons statute, the Sixth District
decided that the Legislature's revised service of summons statutes effectively
operated to place new conditions on the section 3853 right to intervene. 710 Here,
the court found company with the Fifth District decision in State Compensation
Insurance Fundv. Selma Trailerand Manufacturing,Co., 711 which held that the
section 3853 right to intervene is qualified by a litigant's procedural duty to
712
prosecute his or her claim diligently.
In Bishop, the Sixth District's rejection of Buell and alliance with Selma
Trailerwas proper. In adopting the new statutory scheme for procedural dismissal
statutes, the Legislature intended to create a brand new ball game. The Legislature
expressly sought to limit the exceptions to the dismissal rules to those specified
713
by statute and thereby preclude courts from adopting new exceptions.
Therefore, the Sixth District correctly refused to construe Labor Code section
3853 so as to create a new exception to one of the dismissal statutes contrary to
the Legislature's intent.
In A. Groppe & Sons Glass Co. v. Fireman'sFundInsuranceCo.,71 4 the court
of appeal upheld the trial court's discretionary dismissal of an action for failure
to serve summons within two years. The plaintiff's proffered justification for the
delay was that it had filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy action in federal court,
thereby losing standing to prosecute the state court action, and there was nothing
that the plaintiff could do to force the bankruptcy trustee to pursue the state court

706.
Id. at 1327, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
707.
Id. at 1325,285 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15; see Buell v. CBS, Inc., 136 Cal. App. 3d823, 826,186 Cal.
Rptr. 455. 457 (1982) (holding, on facts identical to those in Bishop, that California Labor Code § 3853
created an unconditional right to intervene without regard to any prior noncompliance with a procedural
statute).
708.
Bishop, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1325-26, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
709.
Id. at 1326, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 915; see also 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 600, sec. 1, at 2574-75 (amending
CAL. Cv. PRoc. CODE § 581(a)(f)(2)) (implying the due diligence exception to the dismissal statute, based on
impossibility or impracticability to a party excusing compliance with the statute, is applicable).
710.
Id. at 1325-26. 285 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
711.
210 Cal. App. 3d 740,258 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1989).
712.
Id. at 755, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (affirming a dismissal for delay in prosecution by ruling that an
intervenor must demonstrate diligence from the filing of the original complaint and not from the filing of the
complaint-in-intervention).
713.
See CAL Cirv. PROC. CODE §§ 583.250(b), 583.360(b) (West Supp. 1994).
714.
232 Cal. App. 3d 220,283 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1991).
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litigation further.7 5 The appellate court disagreed. The court stated that the
plaintiff could have requested an order compelling the trustee to prosecute the
pending state action and, if the order were denied, the plaintiff would then have
evidence which established that it was impossible for the plaintiff to serve
summons on the defendant! ' 6 The significance of Groppe was that the Sixth
District extended existing law regarding the impact of a plaintiff's Chapter 7
bankruptcy action on the dismissal rules to a situation where the plaintiff seeks
to avoid the dismissal rules by virtue of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy action 17 The
court essentially found that any differences between a liquidation proceeding
(Chapter 7) and a reorganization proceeding (Chapter 11) were not significant
enough to compel different results; in both cases, the debtor must request the
trustee to pursue litigation claims or else risk the loss of those claims on

procedural grounds!"
B. The PlaintiffObtaineda Reversal of a Dismissal in One Case
In Romadka v. Hoge, 9 the plaintiffs won a reversal of a judgment of
dismissal. The plaintiffs brought an action in Santa Clara County and then refiled
the same action in Santa Cruz County 2 In dismissing the first action, the
plaintiffs' attorney inadvertently checked the "with prejudice" box on the request
for dismissal form.72 As a result, the Santa Clara County action was dismissed,
the Santa Clara County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the
dismissal, and the Santa Cruz County action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. m The court of appeal held that the dismissal with prejudice of the Santa
Clara County action was invalid because the attorney lacked authority from his
client to dismiss the action with prejudiceZ Thus, the denial of the plaintiffs'
motion to vacate the dismissal was an abuse of discretion.' In light of its reversal
of the denial of the motion to vacate in the first action, the Sixth District reversed
the judgment in the Santa Cruz action because res judicata obviously no longer
applied. 7"
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XI. CONCLUSION

The Sixth District Court of Appeal marked its tenth anniversary in November
1994. 2 Over its first nine years, the court has exhibited several striking trends
in its published decisions in civil cases. The results and currents in the court's
decisions in 1991-1993 can be viewed most fruitfully in the context of the court's
first nine years.
Throughout its history, the Sixth District has demonstrated that it does not
have of a benign view tort liability. That trend definitely continued in 1991-1993.
As in past years, the government prevailed in every tort case in which it was a
defendant.' The court also continued to favor private defendants in tort cases in
1991-1993, but not in property contamination cases nor tort cases involving the
application of a statute of limitations, where the court's decisions were split.
A hallmark of the Sixth District's decisions in insurance law cases has been
that the court usually denies insurance coverage and rejects liability in bad faith
actions against insurers.7" In 1991-1993, the court's decisions continued in the

same direction, but not to the same degree as in past years.729 In a majority of its
coverage cases during the last three years, the court found no coverage.73 Further,
the court ruled for insurers in both of its bad faith cases in 1991-1993.7t
During its first nine years, the Sixth District has shifted its direction in
employment and labor law cases. In 1985-1987, the court decided virtually every
employment or labor dispute in favor of the employer.73 2 In 1988-1990, the court
continued to favor employers in its decisions, but not in every case.73 In 19911993, the Sixth District's employment and labor law decisions were split down
the middle.7' The court was just as likely to rule for the employee or union as for
the employer. This change in direction signifies that the Sixth District no longer
favors employers.
The court's environmental and land use opinions over its first nine years
revealed no noticeable dispositions of the court. During its first three years, the
court showed an inclination to uphold a CEQA challenge to a public entity's land
use approval. 3 5 During the last six years, however, the court has shown a
tendency to conclude that the government complied with CEQA in an environ-

726.

Emerging Trends, supra note I, at 1067; see id. (noting that the Sixth District Court of Appeal

began operation on November 19, 1984).
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See 1988-1990 Review, supranote 1,at 1105, 1152-53.
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451 See Emerging Trends, supranote 1, at 1106, 1125.
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mental case. 73 Apart from CEQA cases, the court has exhibited no proclivity to
uphold or invalidate government land use regulations. Over the years (and
especially in 1991-1993), the court's non-CEQA land use decisions have been
evenly divided between property owners and public entities. 3 7 Similarly, the
results in the court's other cases involving real property law issues have produced
no observable trends over the years.
From its inception to the present, the Sixth District has been a staunch
defender of First Amendment values in constitutional law cases. The court
especially safeguards the rights of free speech and freedom of the press.3 8 That
trend continued in 1991-1993, as the court protected First Amendment rights in
two cases. During the last three years, the court additionally demonstrated an
inclination to strike down new taxes created by ballot measures where the vote
did not satisfy the supermajority requirement of Proposition 13.
Finally, over its first six years and again in 1991-1993, the court strictly
applied procedural dismissal rules so as to prevent a plaintiff from litigating his

or her action on the merits.7 39 Throughout its nine years, the court has not
tolerated excuses for failures to comply with procedural rules nor requests to
create exceptions to the dismissal rules.7
As the court has reached its tenth anniversary and continues to experience
changes on the bench, it will be interesting to see whether the above trends
continue or whether the court pursues new directions.

736.
See 1988-1990 Review, supra note 1, at 1119, 1153; supranotes 452-460 and accompanying text
(discussing the Sixth District's decision in the only CEQA case it heard).
737.
460 See 1988-1990 Review, supra note 1, at 1128; supra notes 461-503 and accompanying text
(describing the absence of any trend emerging from the Court's decisions on land use regulations).
738.
See 1988-1990 Review, supranote 1, at 1135, 1153.
739.
See 1988-1990 Review, supra note 1, at 1145,1153; Emerging Trends, supranote 1, at 1071, 1076
(noting the Sixth District's strict construction of statutes limiting the right to bring an action and the court's
refusal to aid a sympathetic but untimely plaintiff); supra notes 683-718 and accompanying text (examining

the court's strict construction of dismissal statutes).
740. See 1988-1990 Review, supranote 1,at 1145, 1153 (noting that the court had always strictly applied
dismissal statutes, thus preventing plaintiffs from presenting the merits of their cases).
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